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Abstract  
Critical Infrastructure is often overlooked from an Information Security perspective as being 
of high importance to protect which may result in Critical Infrastructure being at risk to 
Cyber related attacks with potential dire consequences. Furthermore, what is considered 
Critical Infrastructure is often a complex discussion, with varying opinions across audiences.  
 
Traditional Critical Infrastructure included power stations, water, sewage pump stations, gas 
pipe lines, power grids and a new entrant, the “internet of things”. This list is not complete 
and a constant challenge exists in identifying Critical Infrastructure and its interdependencies. 
 
The purpose of this research is to highlight the importance of protecting Critical 
Infrastructure as well as proposing a high level framework aiding in the identification and 
securing of Critical Infrastructure. To achieve this, key case studies involving Cyber crime 
and Cyber warfare, as well as the identification of attack vectors and impact on against 
Critical Infrastructure (as applicable to Critical Infrastructure where possible), were identified 
and discussed. Furthermore industry related material was researched as to identify key 
controls that would aid in protecting Critical Infrastructure.  
 
The identification of initiatives that countries were pursuing, that would aid in the protection 
of Critical Infrastructure, were identified and discussed.  Research was conducted into the 
various standards, frameworks and methodologies available to aid in the identification, 
remediation and ultimately the protection of Critical Infrastructure. A key output of the 
research was the development of a hybrid approach to identifying Critical Infrastructure, 
associated vulnerabilities and an approach for remediation with specific metrics (based on the 
research performed). 
 
The conclusion based on the research is that there is often a need and a requirement to 
identify and protect Critical Infrastructure however this is usually initiated or driven by non-
owners of Critical Infrastructure (Governments, governing bodies, standards bodies and 
security consultants). Furthermore where there are active initiative by owners very often the 
suggested approaches are very high level in nature with little direct guidance available for 
very immature environments. 
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1  Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical Infrastructure is often overlooked from an Information Security perspective as being 
of high importance to protect, with the perceived risk and impact often being described as 
being minimal. Critical Infrastructure includes the likes of power stations, water and sewage 
pump stations, gas pipe lines and power grids. Some of this infrastructure is operated utilising 
legacy technology such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (“SCADA”) technology 
which enables control over infrastructure (including monitoring and collecting data from 
systems that control and/or monitor a process sometimes remotely). 
 
Legacy Critical Infrastructure by default was segregated from other systems due to propriety 
protocols being used to control and monitor devices predominantly over serial based 
communications (sometime RF where cable was not a viable option). However, since the 
early 1990’s many of these devices have been migrated to Ethernet-based IP communications 
and as such, have limited security controls which in an IP-based environment is paramount 
(The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2011). Due to nature of the 
Infrastructure and the often remote location, there is often a requirement for it to accessed 
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remotely. The implementation of connectivity is often without the implementation of 
essential security controls (for example firewalls, 2-factor authentication), which is 
paramount since inherently this infrastructure was designed without adequate security 
controls due its previous “by default” segregation. 
 
The risk to Critical Infrastructure has long been on the agenda of developed economies with 
countries like United States leading the world in research and potential mitigation of security 
related risks (Wenger, Metzger, & Dunn, 2004) .  An interesting study was performed by the 
US Government on the US water infrastructure as to understand the risks and potential 
impact of Cyber attacks on Critical Infrastructure.  The analysis noted the potential for 
remote attacks on pump stations to easily result in the potential shutdown of these pumps 
(causing on average half a million people to lose access to running water per pump station). 
Since most pumps are custom built, it may take anywhere from a few months to a year to 
repair (since the attack resulted in physical damage resulting from continuous switching 
on/off).  The analysis also identified the potential risk that the loss of power to key water 
systems may result in the release of untreated sewage water back into the ecosystem 
(Meinhart, 2006).  
 
Cyber attacks are a reality and requirement to protect Critical Infrastructure cannot be 
ignored.  A key challenge however is identifying Critical Infrastructure through assessments 
as well as identifying critical dependencies to classify infrastructure as critical. Furthermore 
assigning risk is always a challenge in the context of Cyber related attacks not to mention the 
almost certain question that one is challenged with as to why this is only now becoming an 
issue. 
 
The paradox of what is deemed to be Critical Infrastructure to one individual may be 
different to another. In this context one should consider the nature of the service that the 
infrastructure provides and the potential impact the loss there-of would result in, which 
should form the basis for deciding the ultimate classification. Furthermore the nature of 
threats that could impact Critical Infrastructure may include Hacktivism, Cyber Warfare and 
Cyber Crime. To this point the Emerging Cyber Threat Report of 2008 (Ahamad, Amster, 
Barrett & Cross, 2008) suggests that Cyber Warfare is one of the top five risks to Information 
Security with targets strongly focused on Critical Infrastructure. 
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One must consider that legacy utility infrastructure by design utilised technology that was 
proprietary in design, using predominantly protocols and connectivity topologies that by 
default resulted in the environments being segregated from the general IT infrastructure.  
With the evolution of utility infrastructure, the situation has changed considerably with the 
migration to IP based technology utilising standard network topologies/protocols.  This may 
have resulted in Critical Infrastructure being exposed to the Internet or general networking 
environment without the implementation of adequate controls to mitigate potential risks. 
 
In developing economies, funding for Information Security initiatives is already under 
funded, and by design single points of failure (for example, limited sources of electricity 
supply and generation) already exist, highlighting the potential for the loss of key 
infrastructure being a reality. For developing economies, such as those in Africa and Asia, 
this will have significant and far reaching consequences, especially in the context of 
supplying basic services to populations that reside within. Running water and electricity are 
generally considered a luxury and ensuring that these basic services are provided is the focus 
rather than securing them from potential Cyber Attacks, which as a possible risk to supply is 
simply a non-starter (Akuta, Monari, & Jones, 2011; Cassim, 2011). One should also consider 
the every constant Information Security skills shortages that the market is experiencing, such 
as in South Africa (Wall, 2006). 
 
 
1.1. Objectives of this Research  
The core objective of this research was to aid in the awareness for the protection of Critical 
Infrastructure as well as create a hybrid framework that facilitates a feasible approach to 
identifying and classifying infrastructure as critical.  
 
The hybrid framework should include the ability for organisations to identify potential threat 
vectors that they may face, consideration for appropriate controls as well as include a risk 
based approach to identifying security deficiencies. 
 
 In order to substantiate the validity of developed framework, key aspects would be applied to 
an organisation and validated through the use of a relevant case study.  For the research, 
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existing risk methodologies/frameworks for the assessment of Critical Infrastructure will be 
adapted. An existing approach (high level methodology) that has been proposed for accessing 
a countries susceptibility to an attack on its Critical Infrastructure, NIPP (Homeland Security, 
2013) will be evaluated and modified for suitability in the context of immature environments. 
 
Control consideration should include controls that should fall within the scope of public 
domain (cyber related legislation, adherence to international cyber treaties, national 
Computer Security Incident Response Team) as well as suggest, where feasible and at a high 
level, compensating controls for controls that are absent.   
 
To provide context to the risks facing Critical Infrastructure, example of Cyber related attacks 
including Cyber Crime and Cyber Warfare will be identified and discussed. 
 
1.1.1. The core objectives 
The core objectives of this research were to: 
 Provide context for what is considered to Critical Infrastructure and why it is now at risk 
 Identify the overlap between Critical Infrastructure and Critical Information Infrastructure  
 Identify key attacks on Critical Infrastructure in the context of Cyber Warfare and 
Cybercrime 
 To identify methodologies applicable to the protection of Critical Infrastructure in the 
context of immature environments 
 Propose activities that will enable the protection of Critical Infrastructure in the context of 
the proposed methodology, including the identification of appropriate activities per phase 
of the methodology 
 Identify at a high level, appropriate controls for protecting Critical Infrastructure.  
 
1.2. Scope and Limits 
The scope of the research specifically excludes: 
 The identification of specific Critical Infrastructure 
 The identification of a mandatory complete list of security controls 
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 Proving the hybrid framework through the use of case studies and/or interviews 
 
1.3. Document Structure 
The below list is a summary of the key sections found in this documents as well as a brief 
summary of the chapter content: 
 Chapter 2 (Literature Review) – During this chapter the definition of Critical 
Infrastructure is discussed along with key Cyber related events that have impacted Critical 
Infrastructure.   
 Chapter 3 (Critical Infrastructure Assessment Framework) – A hybrid framework for the 
protection of Critical Infrastructure is discussed as well as expansion of key areas of the 
framework 
 Chapter 4 (Framework case study simulation) – The hybrid framework is applied to a 
Telecommunication company as to illustrate application 
 Chapter 5 (Conclusion) – This chapter concludes the paper and reflects on the 
achievement of the stated research objectives including the future proposed extensions to 
the research. 
 Chapter 6 (References). 
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2  Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. What is Critical Infrastructure 
This chapter discusses the constant challenge of how and what to define as Critical 
Infrastructure. How different nation states view and classify infrastructure is examined along 
who is responsible for doing so. 
 
One would state that roads, highways, dams, power grids and telecommunications (to name a 
few) at high level should be considered critical however in certain instances failure of 
infrastructure may affect some but not others. To this end how does one define what is 
Critical Infrastructure? A good analogy can be borrowed from the US office of Homelands 
Security (Theron & Bologna, 2013) who said: “The assets, functions, and systems within 
each Critical Infrastructure sector are not equally important. The transportation sector is 
vital, but not every bridge is critical to the Nation as a whole”.  
 
The challenge with identifying Critical Infrastructure is also further complicated by the fact 
that infrastructure has dependencies and interdependencies with other Critical Infrastructures 
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with many of these interdependencies driven by IT systems - suggested to be classified as 
ICT (Luiijf, Burger, & Klaver, 2003). 
 
The inability to identify what Critical Infrastructure is stems from the lack of understanding 
of what is vital to a country’s inhabitants. This is a view further shared by many including 
researchers Luiijf et al. (2003) who suggest that the Netherlands do not have a “crisp” 
definition either. Luiijf et al. (2003) set about attempting to define the Netherlands Critical 
Infrastructure and suggested the definition being the “services defining minimum quality 
levels”.  This transitioned the discussion to a political level surrounding what a country’s 
inhabitants expect as a “minimum” which resulted in the following five key indicators being 
identified: 
 National and International law & order 
 Public Safety 
 Economy 
 Public heath  
 Ecological environment. 
 
Luiijf et al (2003) engaged with government departments responsible for the previously 
identified indicators, requiring them to complete questionnaires per potential vital 
product/service.  Of the analysis of data resulting from 50 questionnaires, they concluded that 
the energy sector, human-oriented services like drinking water, food and health services, 
telecommunications and transport sectors scored highly. However of particular interest and 
considerably of most importance is the conclusion that the above services are supported by 
information and communications technology making them particularly susceptible to attacks 
of a Cyber nature.  
 
The research generally suggests that Critical Infrastructure also be categorised according to 
the following criteria within the context that certain services may have an immediate impact 
(due to key interdependencies) that could (after a certain amount of time) have an irreversible 
affect (for example electricity supply): 
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fast impact with slow recovery services, e.g. water quality 
slow impact with slow recovery, e.g. shipping, 
fast impact and fast recovery, e.g. telecommunications 
slow impact with fast recovery 
very fast impact and very fast recovery, e.g. emergency communications 
Table 1 - Recovery Classification - (Luiijf et al., 2003) 
Moteff & Parformak (2004)  issued a report for the United States Congress on the “Definition 
and identification of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets” which suggested that the 
“ambiguous or changing list of Critical Infrastructure” could lead to “inefficient use of 
limited homeland security resources”. This report was aimed at highlighting the changes and 
possible development of the definition in light of the debate and shift from public policy as 
well as the movement from “infrastructure adequacy to infrastructure protection”. 
 
The report discusses various mandates and policy trends relating to the classification of 
Critical Infrastructure. An interesting perspective provided by this report, was how the 
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 
(“HSPDIC”) defined the following categories of Critical Infrastructure as well as the 
responsible department for ensuring its protections (refer to Table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Critical Infrastructure protection ownership - (Moteff & Parfomak, 2004) 
Department 
Dept. of Commerce -  Information and Telecommunications 
Dept. of the Treasury -  Banking and finance 
Environmental Protection Agency -  Water supply 
Dept. of Transportation -  Aviation, Highways, Mass transit, Pipelines, Rail, Waterborne 
commerce 
Dept. of Justice/FBI -  Emergency law enforcement services 
Federal Emergency Management Agency -  Emergency fire service 
Continuity of government services 
Dept. of Health and Human Services -  Public health service, including prevention, 
surveillance, laboratory services and personal health services 
Dept. of Energy -  Electric Power ,Oil and gas production and storage 
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2.2. Critical Information Infrastructure 
The terms Critical Infrastructure (“CI”) or Critical Information Infrastructure (“CII”) are 
often used and can easily be interchangeably, although there is a distinct difference between 
the two definitions (Mboneli & Herbst, 2010). Often initiatives for the protection of Critical 
Infrastructure or Critical Information Infrastructure (“CII”) are phrased Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (the same would apply for Critical Infrastructure Protection). 
 
The context for the additional terminology of CII is due to the evolution of risks that face the 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure which has evolved substantially from physical risk to that 
of the greatest risk being damage to Critical Infrastructure through ICT related vulnerabilities 
(Military Operations Research Society, 2010).  
 
The introduction of the term Critical Infrastructure Information Protection (“CIIP”) refers to 
the “communications or information service(s) whose availability, reliability and resilience 
are essential to the functioning of a modern (national) economy, security, and other essential 
social values”(Willke, 2007). This would suggest that services such as telecommunications, 
power distribution and water supply (to mention a few) would be included.  
 
The challenge is trying to make a distinction between CIP and CIIP, as similarities and 
overlaps exist.  The definition strives for a distinction that suggests where major ICT exists 
with a significant interdependency with ICT infrastructure it be classified as a subset of CIP 
but under the terminology CIIP (Bologna, 2005), a view further supported and evolved by 
researchers Mboneli & Herbst (2010).  Furthermore they suggest that any ICT infrastructure 
at the core of Critical Infrastructure be classified at CIIP (Rome & Bloomfield, 2010). 
  
2.3. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
To appropriately define the scope of what would encompass CIIP, specifically what would be 
required to be protected, the requirement to discuss the different instances of actual 
equipment/infrastructure that may form part of CIIP protection is vital. Terms often 
associated with Critical Infrastructure such as SCADA, Industrial Control System (“ICS”) 
and Information Communications Technology (“ICT”) Infrastructure will be discussed in the 
context of Critical Infrastructure.  
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It is also important to understand the subtle differences between SCADA and ICS 
infrastructure as it relates to Critical Infrastructure, as well as the challenge of where ICT 
Infrastructure would lie within the ambit of CIIP. Security researcher Byres suggests that 
SCADA is rather a subset of ICS and that ICS would be the specific term used when 
referencing the automation of industrial systems, whereas SCADA would refer to controls 
systems that “span a large geographic area”, although it must be considered all most Critical 
Infrastructure has components of SCADA, PCS and ICS (Byres, 2005). 
 
It is further suggested by Byres (2005) that these systems were developed during an era 
where the micro controller did not exist and often PCS utilised mechanical pneumatics to 
create logic. In contrast,  SCADA systems utilised transistors and radio to achieve same, 
resulting in different terminology since the underlying technology was vastly different 
(Byres, 2005).  
 
An obvious evolution is that Critical Infrastructure is now being bridged with 
communications infrastructure for the purpose of remotely managing and monitoring 
infrastructure.  Furthermore, Critical Infrastructures is now becoming interdependent through 
common communications infrastructure which has resulted in common infrastructures as well 
as that common communication infrastructure being considered critical (Fernandez & 
Fernandez, 2005; Luiijf et al., 2003). 
 
Clemete (2013) suggests that the relationship between the private and public together with 
the incentives and pressures are, and will continue to drive the evolution of infrastructure 
being digitally connected. However the result of this evolution is also changing the risk 
profiles that interconnectivity brings, requiring larger Cyber budgets and stronger policy 
adoption. 
2.4. ISA 99  
 
The greatest challenge to understanding the design of Critical Infrastructure is that the “rules 
of engagement” differ to that of a standard IT Environment. The ISA 99 provides a 
standardised classification for discussing infrastructure across the architecture topology stack.  
Researcher Forster provides a summary of the different devices within the typical ICS 
environment, according to ISA 99, as summarised below: 
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 Level 0  - Controllers and I/O’s that would reside at level 0 and would communicate 
to end point devices 
 Level 1 – This would include Real-time controllers and I/O’s which would encompass 
TCIP/IP controllers, PLC’s and other control network devices 
 Level 2 – This would include components such as supervisory controls, Operator 
HMI SCADA workgroup/domain operating systems and applications 
 Level 3 – Components such as advanced Control and Advance Applications 
(specifically non-critical control applications) Workgroup and network domains with 
mirrored databases. 3rd party networks may also terminate at this level 
 Level 4 – This is the business LAN/Enterprise network level.  A distinction is made 
where no direct connection between the industrial networks and business LANs  is 
made (Forster, 2012). 
 
Forster suggests the use of the ISA 99 standard introduces ‘zones’ and ‘conduits’, which 
provide an easily understandable framework to most IT Security individuals.  Furthermore it 
creates logical areas that for the segmentation/isolation of key sub-systems. 
 
2.5. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the South African 
Context 
Mboneli & Herbst (2010) identify three key Legislative acts that relate specifically to the 
protection of Critical Infrastructure or more specifically the protection of CIIP in South 
Africa:. 
 
 The Electronic Communications Security Pty (Ltd) (Act 86 of 2002) discusses the 
creation of a government agency named “Comsec” with the sole responsibility of 
ensuring that critical electronic communications are protected and secured through co-
ordinated research and development of communications security , products and services 
(The Presidency, 2003).  Furthermore the Act defines communications infrastructure to 
include computers systems and programmes as “organs of the state”. 
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 The Electronic Communications and Transaction Act 25 of 2002 mandated within 
Chapter 9, that critical databases must be registered with the relevant government 
organisation including who the administrators of the database are, its location and the type 
of data that it stores. 
 The National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 of particular internet in regards to Critical 
Infrastructure Protection.  It was passed during the height of unrest during Apartheid 
South Africa (1970’s) where the government were concerned that acts of sabotage 
directed at national infrastructure with the aim in causing the country/economy to 
collapse. The Act never resulted in any list of National Key points being publicly defined 
until the Right2Know Campaign (de Wet & Benjamin, 2015) forced the South African 
Government to produce the list. The list included oil refineries, airports and power 
stations, to mention a few (Pothier, 2013).  
 
The National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 is quite similar to that of  USA patriot Act (Moteff 
& Parfomak, 2004) which allows the Government to do what is required to protect Critical 
Assets with a special mandate. Researchers Mboneli & Herbst (2010) suggests that the above 
Acts mandate responsibility that falls within three completely disparate national government 
departments. The above Acts touches on aspects of Critical Infrastructure protection with one 
single government entity being responsible for driving the requirements/agenda for a 
programme for protecting Critical Infrastructure, something that is quite mature in the United 
States and most European countries (Rome & Bloomfield, 2010). 
 
Mboneli & Herbst (2010) views are shared by many in the academic environment including 
Von Solms who suggests that the greatest threat to Critical Infrastructure in South Africa will 
stem from Cyber related attacks. Ellefsen & Von Solms (2012) suggest that a centralised and 
co-ordinated Cyber Security Policy will be critical as a starting point to protecting Critical 
Infrastructure (Ellefsen & Von Solms, 2012).  
 
The lack of clear direction relating to what is considered Critical Infrastructure is one 
challenge however the criteria upon which Infrastructure is deemed to be critical is 
paramount. Njotini argues that a framework for the protection of Critical Infrastructure is 
important but warns that the “adoption of a one-size-fits-all framework” would suggest that 
Critical Infrastructure could be protected through a “tickbox” exercise (Njotini, 2013). 
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If one focuses specifically on where the greatest Critical Infrastructure interdependencies 
exist then it could be argued that if attacked it would result in the greatest impact. 
 
2.6. Critical Infrastructure Evolution 
 
During the mid 1990’s the United States of America started to evolve the definition of 
Critical Infrastructure from the previously very strictly termed “with respect to the adequacy 
of the nation’s public works” which resulted in defining Critical Infrastructure Protection in 
the context of Homeland security, largely due to growing thread of international terrorism 
(Moteff, Copeland, Fischer, Ave, & Washington, 2003).   
 
While the above does not strictly describe a movement towards the inclusion and reference of 
ICT related components in the overall definition of Critical Infrastructure, it was eventually 
acknowledged by Decision Directive Number 63 which was passed by the then president Bill 
Clinton on May 22, 1998. The directive specifically included a reference for the definition of 
Critical Infrastructure which included “those physical and cyber-based systems essential to 
the minimum operations of the economy and government.” (Moteff et al., 2003). 
 
The question as to why the movement to specifically include cyber related components in the 
definition can be answered through the examination of the evolution in the advancement of 
technology. Critical Infrastructure was previously segregated from other systems using 
propriety protocols to control and monitor devices predominantly over serial based 
communications (sometimes RF was utilised where serial cable was not a viable option) as 
depicted in Figure 1 (The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2011).  
 
Between International Standard Association (“ISA”) 99 levels 3 and 4, the SCADA 
environment was not logically or physically connected to the Enterprise environment (refer to 
Figure 1). 
 
Where systems were located over georgraphically despearant locations, POTS (Plan Old 
Telephone Services) lines utilised analog connecitvity to connect infrastructure allowing 
control from a centralised point while still predominantly achieving a segregated 
environment from the enterpise environment. 
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Therefore, traditional serial based equipment would require an attacker to obtain physical 
access to the equipment in-order to attack it. This is contrary in Ethernet-based IP 
environments where devices can be accessed externally and generally through common 
networks. 
 
Since the early 1990’s, many of these devices (at ISA 99 Level 1 & 2) were migrated from 
serial communications to Ethernet-based IP communications, introducing vulnerabilities into 
the environment since in IP-based environments, communications can be routed and sent to 
an external environment i.e. the internet (The Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure, 2011). Compounding the issue further is that many vendors simply 
encapsulated the serial protocols within TCP/IP wrappers without consideration for 
authentication or the encryption of communications. 
Figure 1 – Sample Legacy SCADA/DCS example (Pollet, 2011) 
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With the movement from serial to IP based communications, the model of one master to one 
slave topology has largely been eradicated, allowing for a one master to multiple slave 
environment. This design would introduce a greater risk should compromise to the master 
occur. Furthermore, the bridging of one master to multiple slave environments would further 
“bridge” traditionally segregated environments.  
 
This situation has been further aggravated (Miller & Rowe, 2012) by the fact that Critical 
Infrastructure control systems have been carelessly connected to the internet without the 
necessary perimeter controls. Critical ICT Infrastructure ecosystem (specifically SCADA and 
ICS related systems – refer to Section 2.3 for explanations on SCADA/ICS) traditionally does 
not include the necessary security controls and never included development with requirement 
of testing code for security related vulnerabilities.   
 
It has been shown that SCADA related infrastructure has been easily exploited utilising 
“proof-of-concept exploit code”, with researchers and industry experts suggesting that 
malware will be specifically written to target SCADA related infrastructure, something that 
was shown to be very viable and effective in the Stuxnet incident (Constantin, 2013). 
 
Another key factor is that ICT related systems are becoming increasingly embedded in 
Critical Infrastructure and are able to control key aspects of its operation which is relatively 
new and as a result of “pervasive computerisation and automation of infrastructures over 
several decades” (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). Rinaldi et al. (2001) suggests that 
the “reliable operation of modern infrastructure depends on computerised control systems, 
from SCADA systems that control electric power grids, to comprised systems that manage 
the flow of railcars and goods in the industry”.  These interdependencies are driving the 
potential for extreme impact on the inhabitants of country should a failure occur with 
communications infrastructure that has interdependencies.  
 
Another key and relatively new factor is extensively discussed by researcher Luiijf who 
describes the importance that technology itself has become as a critical element in day to day 
living.  In support of this, the Dutch Cabinet released a memorandum (Luiijf & Klaver, 2000) 
entitled “the digital delta”  which suggests that the high level of ICT integration in society 
makes the functioning of that society dependant on telecommunication systems and suggests 
the importance of ensuring the securing thereof.  In support of this statement a recent report 
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from the Dutch government suggests “serious disruptions to the ICT-based infrastructures 
could, increasingly, lead to a similar situation after a number of hours, given that our society 
is becoming increasingly dependent on chain processes such as electronic payment, logistical 
just-in-time systems” (H. Luiijf & Klaver, 2000). 
 
Researchers Luiijf et al. (2003) believes that ICT integration into everyday life ensures  that 
we are “increasingly dependent on the underlying infrastructures”, which is illustrated by the 
hype and panic surrounding the millennial Y2K issue. It was further suggested that while the 
public thinks the Y2K issue was a “storm in a tea cup”, problems were still experienced and 
actually had nothing been done the impact would have been significant. 
 
2.7. Critical Infrastructure at Risk 
The threat to Critical Infrastructure could potentially arise from various types of scenarios 
and types of transgressors. These would range from acts of Cyber Crime to acts of Cyber 
Terrorism (refer to Section 2.7.1 and 2.7.3 for definitions).  
 
During the introduction it was positioned that Critical Infrastructure was previously 
segregated by default from other environments through the use of propriety protocols and 
most importantly, physical and logical separation from production environments. With the 
Critical Infrastructure context largely evolved to an environment where ICT infrastructure is 
mostly embedded in all aspects of Critical Infrastructure, as well as the transition of 
technology itself becoming critical, the risk from Cyber related attacks on Critical 
Infrastructure cannot be ignored. 
 
The risk to Critical Infrastructure has long been on the agenda of developed economies with 
countries like United States leading the world in research and potential mitigation of security 
related risks.  As referred to earlier in the introduction, the study performed on the US water 
infrastructure system in 2006 by the US Government, illustrates the potential impact Cyber 
events may have (The United States Government, 1997). 
 
Developing economies are preoccupied with unemployment, HIV/AIDS, traditional crimes 
and other social issues and the inability to re-direct resources to focus on the 
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prevention/detection of Cyber related attacked on Critical Infrastructure will ultimately result 
in successful attacks on Critical Infrastructure being a reality (Cassim, 2011). The 
International Energy Agency (“IAEA”) indicated that by 2035 developing economies will 
account for 40 percent of total global nuclear power generation by 2035, mostly being driven 
by increased demand for “clean” power and an abundance of it (Banks & Massy, 2012). 
Compromised Nuclear power stations would certainly introduce significant and catastrophic 
consequences for a country and its inhabitants. 
 
To further conceptualise Cyber-attacks we will explore key events across two key domains, 
namely Cyber Crime and Cyber Warfare. 
 
2.7.1. Cyber Crime 
The term Cyber Crime is defined as the use of electronic means to commit crimes 
(Criminaljusticedegreehub.com, 2013), however for the definition to be applied correctly, 
illegal activities must have been specifically committed using an electronic device such as a 
notebook, tablet and/or phones) connected to a network and/or the Internet.  Cyber Crime 
may manifest itself in many different forms and may often include extortion, cyber-stalking, 
reputational damage (through website defacing), information theft, hacking, Denial of 
Service attacks, phishing attacks, software piracy and credit card fraud, not to mention a 
combination of the above and more (Criminaljusticedegreehub.com, 2013; Fick, 2009). 
 
A typical act of Cyber Crime, Hacktivism, has a very strong political motive utilising digital 
tools to make a political statement.  The word Hacktivism is created from two other words, 
Hack and Activism, which can be interpreted as meaning “the use of computers and computer 
networks as a means of protest to promote political ends” (Mateski et al., 2012). 
Traditionally, these acts were performed utilising DDoS attacks causing the disabling of 
website servers through overloading. The concept was that of a “virtual sitting” with the 
distinguishing fact of intent being “disruptive rather than destructive” (Casserly, 2012). 
Accordingly, and on a strict interpretation, Hacktivism should inevitably be politically 
motivated and utilise the minimum required digital tools to make a political statement (of 
protest). 
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Cyber terrorism is a significantly more aggressive form of Cyber Crime with strong political 
objectives often funded directly or covertly by a country state. The term can be further 
conceptualised as “unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate 
or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of 
political or social objectives”(Sproles & Byars, 1998).  
 
In the context of Africa and more specifically South Africa, the improvement in the  
availability of high speed broadband connectively and the relatively low maturity of the users 
accessing the Internet (Cassim, 2011) has resulted in Cyber-crime becoming rampant in 
South Africa. Recent reports indicate that South Africa has the third highest number of 
Cyber-crime victims behind Russia and China (Mohapi, 2013) and is the second most 
targeted country, with 1 in every 170.9 e-mails identified as phishing attacks and 67.8% of all 
South African e-mail traffic is considered as SPAM (Rosewarne, 2013).   
 
The South African Cyber Threat Barometer 2012/3(Rosewarne, 2013) report indicates that 
Cyber Crime in South Africa is estimated to have cost the country R2.65 billion and while 
there is an expected recovery, an estimated R662.5m would not (Rosewarne, 2013).  This 
same report identified that common vulnerabilities are being exploited and with 
unemployment growing these people may become soft targets for syndicates (IT News 
Africa, 2013). 
 
A prime example illustrating the potential impact Cyber Crime could potentially have on 
Critical Infrastructure would be the July 2008 attack on the JSE stock exchange which 
resulted in network downtime that lasted almost an entire day. The loss of the trade 
differential amounted to over R7 billion (Du Toit, 2008). 
 
2.7.2. Cyber attacks on Critical Infrastructure 
 
The earliest reported Cyber incident affecting Critical Infrastructure dates back to 1982.  The 
disruption was caused by a Trojan which was “planted” in a SCADA system that controlled 
the Siberian Pipeline which affected systems resulting in a significant explosion (Miller & 
Rowe, 2012).  
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In 1992 a disgruntled ex-employee hacked into Chevron’s emergency alert system and re-
configured it to crash.  It was only detected when an emergency arose relating to the release 
of noxious gases which required the system to be invoked.  The potential failure may have 
resulting in citizens living across 22 states in America being put at risk (Miller & Rowe, 
2012).  
 
In June 2000 computer systems belonging to the Maroochy Shires Council in Australia was 
compromised by a disgruntled employee, Vitek Boden, who hacked into the sewage system 
and released millions of litres of raw sewage into the ocean (Abrams & Weiss, 2008). 
 
Some of the most prevalent cases of Cyber-crime involve act of Hacktivism with the Season 
of S0wnage illustrating our Critical dependence on some internet related services. This 
occurred in 2011, affecting the Sony Corporation which stemmed from Sony’s litigation 
against George Hotz after he successfully managed to “jailbreak” the Sony Playstation 3 (in 
the context of the Internet being considered Critical Infrastructure, the attack on Sony is 
considered appropriate for discussion since it resulted in the downtime of the Sony Gaming 
Network which services an extensive user base).  Hotz succeeded twice, however on the 
second attempt he incurred the legal wrath of the Sony Corporation. As a result Sony 
Corporation commenced a legal battle against Hotz. During the ensuing legal battles, the 
California District Court granted Sony Corporation a subpoena providing them with access to 
the IP addresses of anyone who had downloaded “jailbreak” instructions (Kushner, 2012).  
As a result of the litigation, Sony Corporation invoked a hornet’s nest of hatred, attracting the 
attention of Hacktivist groups Anonymous, and subsequently LulzSec (an offshoot group) 
both of whom took exception to Sony Corporation’s actions. The jailbreaking of the 
Playstation 3 was soon to be the least of their concerns. Anonymous initiated Operation Sony 
(OpSony) with the objection of “help out this young lad, and to protest against Sony’s 
censorship” (Kumar, 2011). Shortly thereafter, both Sony.com and Playstation.com were 
attacked using DDOS attacks resulting in the loss of key services, with Anonymous taking 
credit for the attacks, and posting a YouTube video Leave Fellow hackers like geohot alone
*1
 
(Stoeffel, 2012). 
                                                 
1 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/07/machine-politics 
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By June 2011, Sony was subject to numerous attacks, which resulted in Playstation service 
downtime and disclosure of personal customer information.  A key attack vector that resulted 
in the disclosure of personal information was through a simple (almost embarrassing) SQL 
injection exploit (Schwartz, 2011). Losses to the Sony Corporation resulting from Hacktivism 
are estimated by them to be in the region of $170 million.  The losses also take into account 
the costs associated with the breach of customer data, as well as the network outage. Besides 
these costs, Sony’s actual share price dipped by 3.7% (GamePolitics.com, 2011). 
 
2.7.3. Cyber Warfare 
When trying to identify acts of Cyber Warfare researcher Ragnarsson (2010) suggests 
utilising Mcafee (Dewalt, 2009) four key attributes for classifying a Cyber Attack as Cyber 
warfare: 
1. Source – Was the attack carried out or supported by a nation-state? 
2. Consequence – Did the attack cause harm? 
3. Motivation – Was the attack politically motivated? 
4. Sophistication – Did the attack require customised methods and/or complex planning? 
 
While the above criteria may be a guideline it is not necessarily an exact science since the 
appeal of using Cyber related attacks is that one is able to mask the true source of the attack 
therefore making it inherently challenging when trying to identify the source. More 
specifically the source may not always be a nation-state nor may it be possible to link the 
activities back to a nation-state (ISIS or Boko Haram as an example). 
 
George Heron, former chief scientist for McAfee, believes that attacks on Critical 
Infrastructure are not isolated events and that Critical Infrastructure will continue and 
increasingly become targets of enemy nations especially from previously (or currently) 
considered hostile countries (BusinessWorld, 2009). 
 
In support of this, the Georgia Tech Information Security Centre Emerging Cyber Threat 
Report of 2009 (Ahamad et al., 2008) identified Cyber Warfare as one of the top 5 risks to 
Information Security and if one considers the contributing factors to this type of attack being 
attractive, namely its low cost to initiate attacks, lack of key defences, plausible deniability 
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and lack of rules of engagement for conflicting nations, the reasoning behind Heron’s 
thinking becomes apparent. 
 
At the 2012 International Conference on Cyber conflict, researchers presented a study on the 
susceptibility of countries Critical Infrastructure by correlating a country’s Internet-
infrastructure level vs. its ability to deal with Cyber threats and the steps already taken by 
countries to defend against potential threats on Critical Infrastructure. The key findings from 
this report were that developing economies were increasing their Internet connectivity faster 
than developed countries and drew a direct correlation between the potential for Cyber threats 
on Critical Infrastructure and the density of Internet access within that country (Keren & 
Elazari, 2012).  While the study indicated that while perhaps developed economies Critical 
Infrastructure was more likely to be the target of Cyber attacks, it was somewhat offset by the 
countries Cyber defence initiatives. Of most interest was the countries that had the lowest 
Internet-infrastructure had generally no measures in place to protect Critical Infrastructure.  
 
Probably the most publicised Cyber Warfare attack affecting Critical Infrastructure is that of 
the Stuxnet and Duqu which are often viewed as SCADA “game changers” in that they were 
specifically designed to compromise SCADA devices and more specifically, certain types of 
PLC’s (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011), which are devices that monitor inputs and based 
thereon, will affect other devices to perform activities(Advanced Micro Controllers Inc, 
2014) .  
 
2.8. Cyber Warfare attacks on Critical Infrastructure  
 
As discussed during Section 2.7, the Stuxnet worm was specifically designed to attack a PLU 
through the exploitation of the Siemens default password that was hardcoded into the device 
and was used to access Windows workstations that operated the control application. The 
worm searched for “frequency-converter drives” which were specifically manufactured by 
Fararo Paya in Iran and Vacon in Finland and “altered the frequency of the electrical current 
to the drives causing them to switch between high and low speeds”. The continual switching 
caused “the centrifuges to fail” (Miller & Rowe, 2012). Through various sources it is thought 
that this attack originated from the Israeli and the United States governments (Kushner, 2013)  
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Another interesting example which speaks to the concerns of the US army relating to clean 
water infrastructure.  In November of 2011 there was an attack on a water pump facility at the 
Springfield water utility that originated from an IP Address located in Russia.  The 
Department of Home Land Security played down the risk but soon after that a similar facility 
was compromised in Houston (Neil, 2011).  
 
Sections 2.8.1-3 discuss examples of Cyber Warfare where attacks on Critical Infrastructure 
are explored for purpose of illustrating the how the attacks affected the onset of the war and 
how the availability of Cyber as a medium of attack have evolved the art of warfare. 
 
2.8.1. Cyber Warfare in Estonia 
Estonia, while a small country consisting of 1.4 million citizens has established a strong and 
efficient online e-services portfolio with 97% percent of bank transactions occurring online 
with significant internet penetration across 60% of the country’s population with the country 
significantly dependant on the internet since the government operates a virtually paperless 
environment (Herzog, 2011). A further illustration for their adoption of technology is that the 
ability of citizens to vote electronically during the 2007 elections, which 5.5% of the voters 
did (Kozlowski, 2014). 
 
In 2007 Estonia fell victim to Cyber Warfare attacks affecting e-services including three of 
the country’s six news agencies, two of the largest banks specialising in online transactions, 
key e-services as well as the parliamentary e-mail servers. The attack resulted in credit card 
and automatic tellers being unable to complete transactions for several days. It is suspected 
that the attack was in in retaliation to the removal of a Bronze statue erected by Russia during 
the liberation after World War II (Traynor, 2007). The removal thereof was seen as 
disrespectful to the Russian soldiers who fought against the Nazi’s however a sign of 
oppression to the Estonians (Kozlowski, 2014). 
 
The attacks on the above key e-services were delivered through DDoS attacks originating 
from IP addresses all over the world.  While the early attacks originated from the Russian 
owned IP addresses and perhaps more incriminating IP addresses owned by Russian State 
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institutions, the European Commission and NATO technical experts were unable to conclude 
on the available evidence pointing toward the incrimination of Russia.  This inability to trace 
the attacks is largely due to the use of globally dispersed hosts and virtually un-attributable 
botnets (Herzog, 2011). Investigation was further complicated by the lack of support by the 
Russian government perhaps indicating there direct involvement in the attacks (Ruus, 2008). 
 
The Estonians were perhaps better equipped to deal with the Cyber attack than would have 
probably been expected however it was still necessary to engage with the government 
CERT’s of the Finland, German, Israel and Slovenia to restore operations (Kozlowski, 2014). 
More specifically a public and private sector agreement was utilised in an attempt to defend 
the Cyber Infrastructure from the attacks. Even with the additional support from these 
countries, the attacks could not be fully defended against without a full counter-attack 
required to obtain control of the situation which was already into its 3
rd
 week of operation.  
 
Of particular interest is that this attack clearly illustrated the reliance on Critical Information 
Infrastructure and a “bridge” to various key support services. 
 
2.8.2. Cyber Warfare in Georgia 
The conflict within Georgia related to two specific provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhaza, 
which resulted in the province of Ossetia attacking other provinces of Georgia.  
Georgia responded to the securing parts of Ossetia while at the same time Russian was 
moving forces to protect the sovereign rights of South Ossetians which resulted in extensive 
fighting between Russian and Georgia (Markoff, 2008). 
 
Of particular interest to this incident is the suggestion by the Georgian National Security 
Council chief Eka Tkeshelashvili that Georgia was invaded by Air, Sea, Land and now a 
fourth avenue, that of “Cyberspace” (Shachtman, 2009). More specifically it was the first 
time that the relationship between conventional warfare and Cyber-attacks was visible, 
illustrated by the fact that conventional warfare did not attack Georgian electrical 
infrastructure but rather left that to be attacked through Cyber.  Kozlowski further suggests 
that the preparation for the attack must have taken proper planning since the access to attack 
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tools and co-ordinated instructions could not have been prepared in one day (Kozlowski, 
2014). 
 
The attacks resulted in over $300 million of damage to civilian infrastructure (International 
Crisis Group, 2008) with actual Cyber attacks directed to specifically as interfere with the 
Georgian Governments ability to distribute information during the invasion. This was 
achieved through introducing large amounts of data which essentially overloaded Internet 
communications. Besides a disruption in communications, it also resulted is the national bank 
disconnecting itself from the Internet for almost 10 days (The United States Government, 
2009), causing a significant delay in electronic transactions.. 
 
It has also been suggested that an organised crime unit, RBN must have had direct 
involvement, since it has strong ties to the Russian Government.  Russia’s involvement is 
further supported by New York Times reporter, Morkoff  (2008), who reports that many 
security researchers agree that Russia was responsible cyber-attacks on Georgia.  
 
The US Cyber Consequences Unit (Gorman, 2009) recently found evidence that supports the 
notion that common Microsoft software was “refashioned” into Cyber “weapons” with co-
ordination occurring through common social media platforms Twitter and Facebook resulting 
in co-ordinated attacks using Botnets (The United States Government, 2009). 
 
An interesting report by Major William Ashmore of the US Army (2008) suggests that 
Georgia IT infrastructure was not very advanced, so the attackers easily have caused the 
Denial of Service attack which resulted in their banking, media and government websites 
being blocked, halting communications both internally and externally. Websites for foreign 
ministry and the National Bank were hacked, resulting in the pictures being added of Adolf 
Hitler and the then Georgian President. 
 
Furthermore Ashmore suggests that they attack on Georgia were more supplicated than those 
on Estonia as they involved the use of SQL injection combined with Denial of Service 
attacks.  Furthermore, while it not unusual for cellular towers to be targeted during a conflict 
there Internet Infrastructure was specifically targeted during the on-line Cyber-attacks 
(Borchard, Fox, Long, Mcveigh, & Moodie, 2008). 
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2.8.3. Cyber Warfare on Kyrgyzstan 
In 2009 the main internet servers were attacked using Denial of Service attacks which 
resulted in key websites and country specific e-mail being rendered in-operable. During the 
attacks, at least 80% percent of the internet communications were disabled, mostly through 
the penetration of two of Kyrgyzstan’s four Internet service providers (Jenik, 2009).  This 
resulted in over 80% of external communications being lost and since Kyrgyzstan’s online 
services are quite limited, it resulted in limited direct impact to country. 
 
2.9. Critical Infrastructure protection 
The controls required to protect a Critical Infrastructure are not significantly different from 
the security controls one would implement as of part general IT infrastructure security 
however one must consider the scale, efforts and importance to protecting Critical 
Infrastructure.  Critical Infrastructure has components that are sensitive in nature and 
generally affect large geographic areas, something which general Information Security 
professionals would not be accustomed to. 
 
It is important to be note that Zero day vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure may be more 
prevalent since awareness and focus on securing Critical Infrastructure is fairly immature 
resulting in significant impact for organisations and countries alike (refer to Section 2.6).   
 
Below are some of the different approaches to protecting Critical Infrastructure including 
consideration for specific controls and organisational units that may aid in the protection of 
Critical Infrastructure (some of which are incorporated into the Section 3 of the proposed 
framework for the protection of Critical Infrastructure). 
 
2.9.1. NIPP 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (“NIPP”) for the United States (Homeland 
Security, 2013) suggests a risk framework devised of the following key phases which was a 
directive from US Government with the objective of ensuring a defined and centralised 
approach to the protection of Critical Infrastructure.  What is important to highlight is that 
NIPP was formed from the input obtained through the collaboration between private and 
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government counterparts, which was deemed to be paramount to ensuring national Critical 
Infrastructure security and resilience. 
 
NIPP suggests three key elements of Critical Infrastructure (physical, cyber and human) must 
be specifically identified and integrated through all the stages of the framework.  
 
The framework has five key stages identified which are explored in a generic context: 
1. Set Goals and Objectives – Goals and objectives should be clearly defined and generally 
include indicators which are tangible in nature. This will ensure outcomes are measurable 
to determine success 
2. Identify Infrastructure – Some key challenges in the identification of infrastructure exists 
some of which were discussed earlier. In the context of Critical Infrastructure it is 
paramount to ensure that all critical and interpedently infrastructure is identified 
3. Assess and Analyse Risks – During this phase of the risk management, Critical 
Infrastructure risk should be assessed accordingly to Threat, Vulnerability and 
Consequence 
4. Implement Risk Management Activities – Based on the outcome of the previous phase, 
risk mitigation procedures should be performed based criticality, costs of remediation and 
the benefit of risk mitigation. NIPP suggest the following key activities: 
5. Measure Effectiveness – Protecting Critical Infrastructure is costly but required. The 
ability to measure the success of the implemented activities is key to ensuring budget 
renewal. NIPP suggest a “integrated and continuing cycle” that evaluates the achievement 
of goals and ensures learning and the adaption during and after simulations and incidents 
(Homeland Security, 2013). 
 
2.9.2. OECD  
The Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) is an international organisation that 
was established in 1960 and has 30 active member countries which focuses on promoting 
policies that drive the resolution of global challenges relating to Critical Infrastructure.  
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Njotini (2013) notes that the OECD promotes the Protection of Critical Infrastructure, more 
specifically it recommends that member countries implement a framework that achieves the 
OECD Security Guidelines for Protection Critical Information Infrastructure (Hyslop, 2007).  
 
Njotini expands on the OECD criteria for Critical Infrastructure Protection through the 
identification of 4 key high level framework sections: prevention, detection, response and 
recovery (OECD, 2008). He suggests no real importance to the order of framework/elements 
although indicates that “elements builds on the other”.  
 
Njotini suggests that prevention should proceed detection and it could be argued prevention is 
superior to detection but these should be seen as parallel streams stream of equal importance, 
which will be discussed further in the research. 
 
Njotini’s (2013) elaborates further of the OECD elements to protecting Critical 
Infrastructure: 
 Prevention – Ntjotini suggests that the real-time prevention of attacks on Critical 
Information Infrastructure is a non-negotiable. The Marsh report (which is a report 
commissioned by the United States President on protecting Critical Infrastructure) 
suggests the it would be costly and irresponsible to wait for disaster to affect Critical 
Infrastructure before implementing the necessary remediation to prevent attacks (The 
United States Government, 1997).   
 Detection – The OECD indicates that a framework should incorporate parameters to 
identify and classify the risk of attacks to Critical Information Infrastructure. Where 
possible the ability to detect and report must be automated. 
 Response – Ntjotini suggests that procedures and measures should be developed and 
established to ensure responses are rapid and achieve effective collaboration.  This could 
possibility be achieved through the use of CERT’s and CSIRTS’s. Njotini refers to the G8 
principles, which offers principles that will aid in the ability to respond to events affecting 
Critical Infrastructure which could be considered in the context of good practise. 
 Recovery – OCED describes incident recovery measures to aid in the recovery of CII’s. 
Ntjotini suggests that incident recovery measures can potentially establish the extent of 
the attacks and provide insight into attack trends which may enable improved intelligence 
to forecast future threats. 
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2.9.3. Key controls in the protection of Critical Infrastructure  
The consideration of key security controls that may aid in the protection of Critical 
Infrastructure may be thought to be illusive in nature. To some security professionals it may 
seem very complicated and poorly articulated and one only has to search the Internet to 
understand why.  Control descriptions are poorly defined (controls are described at a very 
high level and seldom specific to the challenges in protecting Critical Infrastructure) and 
existing methodologies are rather audit focused and less descriptive/prescriptive in the 
specification of controls that may aid in the protection of Critical Infrastructure. The 
illustrative example may be the control statement/objective that Critical Infrastructure is 
required to be logically segregated from the enterprise environment or that all Critical 
Infrastructure is required to be monitored.  At a high level, a valid statement although how 
does an organisation achieve this and are there not specific best practises that should be 
adhered to in context of the above. 
 
Onstott describes four key domain areas under which controls for Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure from Cyber related attacks should be focused on, namely, Continuous 
Monitoring, Configuration Management, Vulnerability Management and Patch management. 
At a quick glance one would reach the conclusion that those domains are not new nor would 
they be new to most organisations (Onstott, 2014).  They challenge is that most organisations 
are failing to ensure that the design and operation of controls under those domains are 
operating effectively. 
 
Typical control definition challenges across the domains could include: 
1. Continuous Monitoring – Collecting logs from an environment is the easy part of 
Continuous Monitoring, however the value in this type of control is obtaining exception 
reporting that easily identifies issues relating to the monitoring team.  
2. Configuration Management – The ability to not only ensure consistent configuration of 
infrastructure but also the ability to monitor changes to infrastructure. 
3. Vulnerability Management – Vulnerability scanning may not be performed sufficiently 
frequently, resulting in vulnerabilities being left exposed. Of greater concern is that 
vulnerability management should simply not be about scanning the environment for 
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vulnerabilities but include the identification and remediation of vulnerabilities prior to 
systems being promoted to production. Consider the introduction of training for 
developers and administrators focused on common security vulnerabilities applicable to 
the work being performed.  
4. Patch management – Patches are not applied timeously and very often vendors are slow to 
approve patches. In the context of Critical Infrastructure, release cycles to address 
vulnerabilities may be slow, leaving organisations vulnerable. As such organisations 
should consider virtual patching to ensure faster patching cycles as well as the 
consideration of compensating controls, like an IPS (Onstott, 2014). 
 
Critical Infrastructure vulnerabilities that are identified would generally fall within the 
Technical, Management or Operational control domains with controls across these domains 
either pre-existing (with design deficiencies) or not at all. 
 
The controls required to protect Critical Infrastructure may not be significantly different from 
the security controls one would implement as of part general IT infrastructure security.  It is 
important to be note that Zero day vulnerabilities may be more prevalent since awareness and 
focus on securing these devices/systems is fairly immature (Zorz, 2012).  Listening to vendor 
suggestions is not always the answer with some vendors having even suggested leaving ICS 
connected directly to the Internet (Mimoso, 2013). One should also consider that some of the 
vulnerabilities may be specific to the corporate environment which may be introducing risk 
into the ICS environment. 
There is extensive research available discussing the merit of certain key technical and 
administrative controls and across various security professionals there are some 
commonalities which has been summarised in Table 3. Sources include researcher Watts who 
focused on vulnerabilities within the Electrical Utility environment, John Pollet who operates 
an expert consultancy firm in the field of ICS security and security researcher Fernandezs 
(Fernandez & Fernandez, 2005; Pollet, 2011; Watts, 2003). 
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2.9.4. Advanced controls and additional control 
considerations 
The controls suggested in Section 2.9.3 are fairly standard in nature and should be considered 
as mandatory in environments where protection is critical.  The Pacific Northwest Nation 
Laboratory (PNNL) recommends key progressive security controls which are based on the 
premise of explicitly trust and deny all otherwise, which is particularly useful in the context 
of Critical Infrastructure (Viveros, 2012) which are usually very specific and controlled 
environments. PNNL progressive controls include: 
1. Dynamic Whitelisting – Provides the ability to deny unauthorised applications and more 
importantly Active X controls, Java scripts and code. This would work on the premise of 
only allowing pre-approved applications and scripts from executing on a system 
2. Memory Protection – This would be a more advanced version of whitelisting but would 
be specifically focused at a memory level. 
3. File Integrity Monitoring – Any file change, addition, deletion, renaming, attribute 
changes, ACL modification, and owner modification is reported which would include 
network shares. While this may seem a very useful control, it must be considered for 
environments where little change is expected, otherwise the alerts would be 
overwhelming and unmanageable. 
Table 3 - Control Summary (Watts, 2003;Fernandez & Fernandez, 2005; Pollet, 2011) 
Standard Technical Controls Standard Administrative Controls 
VPN access into CI should incorporate a separate login as well as a 2-factor authentication  Obtain management support by showing 
ROI for improved security controls 
Passwords changes every 90 days with sufficient password complexity and IP-enabled 
instrumentation having adequate authentication configured with a password/PIN along with 
the requirement for configuration changes to be performed over serial console cable 
(although this has other associated risks) (Fernandez & Fernandez, 2005; Pollet, 2011) 
Implement strong policies 
Physical shielding of cables. Patch panels, multiplexing data streams and encryption of data 
flowing between the nodes and hosts should be applied to all wireless connections. LAN 
devices should also be configured to limit the data rate  (Fernandez & Fernandez, 2005; 
Pollet, 2011). 
Implement procedures to protect Critical 
Cyber assets in the security perimeter 
 
Avoid non-UNIX based operating systems Periodic review of computer accounts and 
physical access rights 
Ensure aggressive patching cycles (Fernandez & Fernandez, 2005; Pollet, 2011) Intrusion detection processes 
Utilise external and internal firewalls & DMZ’s as well as host based firewall/IDS software Monitoring controls producing exception 
reporting 
Disabling of unauthorised or unused computer accounts and physical access right, as well as 
unused network services and ports 
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4. Read Protection – Read is only authorised for specified files, directories, volumes and 
scripts resulting in all other attempts being denied. This control may easily achieved in 
Unix environment rather than a Windows environment, however the principals are sound 
(Viveros, 2012). 
In addition to the above, the below are controls are suggested by myself in conjunction with 
the controls described in Section 2.9.3 which are largely based on my experience of 
remediating Critical Infrastructure: 
 Development of server and infrastructure baseline standards 
 Creation of Critical Infrastructure related awareness training for the entire 
organisation. Including specialised security training for Critical Infrastructure 
engineers, as well as development and training in CIRT response procedures 
 Critical Infrastructure network infrastructure should be physically segregated with 
entry achieved through Thin Client functionality (Jump Servers) 
 Centralised logging of all Critical Infrastructure with exception reporting that is 
capable of detecting and reporting suspicious behaviour 
 Yearly penetration testing and auditing of the environments adherence to defined 
policies and standards. 
 Implement monitoring with exception reporting 
 Implement active IPS linked to the monitoring 
 Implement adequate logical segregation across key environment 
 Ensure not critical systems are exposed to the internet unless achieved through VPN 
technology with two factor authentication (even then it should be limited to low risk 
interfaces). 
 
To focus on Real time monitoring, company Riptech highlights real-time intelligent 
monitoring of ICS systems as a common deficiency as environment generate extensive 
quantities of data flooding Security resources resulting in the inability to recognise attack 
attempts (Riptech, 1999) . 
Monitoring as a control is something that requires careful planning through a gradual 
systematic ramp-up to the monitoring of systems and events. If one considers the zones as 
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defined by ISA 99, monitoring requirements at each level should be defined as the 
requirements will be significantly different. 
Prevention is always better than cure and as such controls designed and implemented should 
predominantly focus preventing compromise with monitoring controls being seen strictly as a 
compensating control. 
2.10. Cyber Incident Forensic Readiness 
Fick (2009) discusses the importance of Cyber forensic readiness in mitigating the risks 
associated with Cyber attacks/breach.  He further describes cyber forensic readiness as the 
ability of an organisation to maximise the use of digital evidence to: 
 Reduce the time taken to respond to an incident 
 Maximise the ability to collect admissible evidence 
 Minimise the length/cost of a cyber-incident investigation 
 Reduce incident recovery time 
 Prevent further losses. 
 
The motivation for being forensically ready is well described above however the drivers in 
the context of Critical Infrastructure protection are somewhat different due to the impact of 
the associated risks should possible disruption materialise (Watts, 2003). One should also 
consider that digital forensics skills are in short supply within a standard IT context 
(Rosewarne, 2013) and it should be similar if not worse within a CI context due its 
specialised nature. 
 
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure in the USA defines the following key 
scenarios where a forensic readiness programme would be beneficial (Centre for protection of 
national infrastructure, 2005): 
 gathering of evidence legally that will be admissible in court without interfering with 
business operations 
 acquisition of evidence focusing specifically on incidents and disputes  
 facilitating  the investigation in a manner that ensures the costs are in proportion to the 
perceived “cost” of the incident 
 minimising the interruption to the business as a result of the investigative activities 
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 ensuring that evidence makes a positive impact on the outcome of any potential legal 
action 
 ensuring compliance with legislation. 
 
Furthermore consideration for a successful readiness programme will have positive bi-
products since the skills and tools may be common to operational troubleshooting, recovering 
of data, monitoring for operational issues, problem solving and achieving compliance and 
performing due diligence (Kent et al., 2006).   
 
As further motivation, one should consider the challenges that organisations face in 
defending themselves against Cyber related threats, something well-articulated by 
CounterTack (2012) who performed a survey across 100 IT executives responsible for 
security at companies with $100m or more in revenue. Of notable interest from the survey 
were the 50 hours per month spent on average by responder studying malware to identify 
attack vectors, the inability to gather real-time attack intelligence due to the lack of technical 
skills as well as the inability to analyse information through the use of analytic tools.  This 
should be overwhelmingly concerning since 84% of responders were vulnerable to Advanced 
Persistent Threats. 
 
Having a forensic readiness program in its most basic form will not prevent a pending Cyber 
Attack however it would certainly aid in the potential to detect a possible attack since the 
environment required to achieve this would largely be common across the requirement for 
Forensic readiness. This provides an opportunity to combine the objectives of being ready 
from a Forensics as well as a Cyber resilience perspective, achieving the ability to drive an 
end-to-end strategy. 
2.11. Summary 
During Chapter 2, Critical Infrastructure is defined and context provided in terms of scope of 
Infrastructure that may be considered Critical. The drivers for protecting Critical 
Infrastructure were discussed including the identification of motivations from various 
countries and organisations to protect Critical Infrastructure. Context was also given to some 
of the attacks that have occurred against Critical Infrastructure, ranging from Cyber Crime to 
Cyber Warfare. 
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In Chapter 3, various approaches available to organisations to protect Critical Infrastructure 
are discussed with the objective of creating a hybridisation approach to identifying, 
remediating and protecting Critical Infrastructure. 
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3  Chapter 3 
Critical Infrastructure Assessment 
Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses researched frameworks and methodologies for identifying Critical 
Infrastructure, their vulnerabilities, as well as going about remediating the vulnerabilities 
while ensuring the process is iterative in nature.  The drivers for this hybrid framework, in 
context of the challenges facing Critical Infrastructure (as discussed during this chapter), 
include the challenge that existing frameworks generally fall into two categories, either very 
high level in nature or very detailed within a very specific sector relating to the protection of 
Critical Infrastructure. 
 
The NIPP Risk Management Framework (as shown in Figure 2) (Homeland Security, 2013) 
forms the basis for the proposed framework since the key phases are high level in nature, but 
provide sufficient generic guidance as to the key order of phases applicable to protecting 
Critical Infrastructure.   It was never developed to provide specific direction for key 
activities, leaving activities largely open to interpretation and in very immature environments 
would be substantially less effective. 
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Figure 2 - NIPP Risk Management Framework (Homeland Security, 2013) 
 
The key phases for the hybrid framework are detailed below in Figure 3 and within each of 
the subsequent sections, the scope and suggested activities are discussed with the objective to 
achieve a holistic approach to identifying, preventing, detecting and responding to the risks 
associated with a potential Cyber related attacks on Critical Infrastructure.  The use of “best 
of breed” methodologies and approaches provides an opportunity to develop a framework 
that is universally applicable. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Proposed Hybrid Framework (After NIPP Framework) 
In developing the hybrid framework consulting firm Deloitte (Godfrey, 2008) advise that a 
framework that achieves a successful approach to security transformation should consider the 
following key challenges: 
 The framework that will be used to define and measure progress against strategic 
objectives 
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 The current maturity of the organisation’s security capabilities 
 The desired state and how representative of the organisation it is  
 Process that the organisation will follow to achieve its desired future state 
 How will the organisation ensure successful delivery of its transformation. 
 
The activities within the proposed framework are developed with the above in mind however 
to specifically achieve the following: 
 Interactive in nature 
 Scalable to suit organisations with varying levels of maturity 
 Top down approach, linked to key business processes 
 Applicability across various environments. 
 
Furthermore, the scope of activities were chosen to ensure that value is derived from the 
security assessments and the approach increase the probability of identifying infrastructure 
related vulnerabilities and in the context of Critical Infrastructure, one must consider that the 
ability to remediate instrumentation and Level 0 devices (discussed in Section 2.5.1) would 
be challenging as reliance on vendors would be key. As such consideration if made by 
focusing on production and server assessments since administrators are generally in a better 
position to remediate/mitigate vulnerabilities. 
 
The NIST Guide to ICS Security Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology indicates the importance of developing a “compelling business case” as the first 
step in implementing a Cyber security program for Critical Infrastructure (Stouffer & 
Scarfone, 2011).  The consideration for this could be included at the completion of Phase 1 
and should achieve business buy-in and support prior to beginning Phase 2 if required ( refer 
to Section 3.4).  
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3.1. Phase 1 - Set goals and objectives 
 
The NIPP framework suggests that Critical Infrastructure owners should identify objectives 
and priorities for Critical Infrastructure Protection that align to sector objectives.  
Consideration of the above should be performed in context of the operational and risk 
environment in conjunction with available funding. NIPP also suggests the consideration for 
resourcing is key although this is also rather a function of budget and while resources take 
time to on-board, budget constraints in most instances would be the greater challenge. 
 
During Phase 1 of framework the above objectives from NIPP would remain however this 
phase should define detailed activities building upon what exists within the NIPP framework. 
The following key activities are proposed to achieve the phase objectives, which is largely 
based on the philosophy of a “balanced scorecard” approach to ensure that the protection of 
infrastructure is aligned to those of the businesses objectives. This aids in avoiding 
misalignment in terms of what IT is protecting and ensures businesses buy in. One should 
also consider that the triad of security priorities differ between General IT and that of Critical 
Infrastructure.  Pieth (2004) suggests the priorities and objectives, as depicted in Figure 4 
(used as a visual indicator), are at opposites across the environment. 
Figure 4 - Security Goals and Priorities (Pieth, 2004) 
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With the above context in mind, Phase 1 ultimately sets the foundation for establishment of a 
transformation program, with the following key activities being suggested to achieve this: 
1. Identify the key business strategic objectives (Section 3.1.1) 
2. Map the business objectives to the key ICT objectives (Section 3.1.2) 
3. KPI’s through metrics (Section 3.1.3) 
4. Consideration of key controls relevant to CIIP domains (Section 3.1.4). 
 
 
3.1.1. Identify the key business strategic objectives  
The protection of Critical Infrastructure from a technology perspective is something that 
should not be driven as a “point in time” exercise but should be iterative in nature and largely 
driven by the business through defined strategic objectives for service delivery to customers. 
 
It has been suggested that IT is no closer to assisting Business in achieving its goals than 
twenty years ago, with alignment to business being at the forefront of concerns for IT 
executives (Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). ISACA suggests that the balanced scorecard 
“translates strategy into action to achieve goals with performance measurement” (IT 
Governance Institute, 2005). 
 
The balanced score card was originally developed by Kaplan and Norton (US Office of 
Personal Management, 2014) and was used specifically to drive business strategies based on 
measurement through the use of KPI’s to ascertain the success of the businesses performance 
against the defined strategies. Recently the balanced scorecard has been adopted for use to 
ensure alignment of IT to the businesses strategic objectives, something which has been an 
industry challenge since IT became the enabler (Saull, 2003). 
 
A suitable approach to completing a balanced scorecard would be through specific workshops 
with key business and IT representatives during which the key sections of the balanced 
scorecard would be completed. During the workshops it is suggested (through my industry 
experience) that the key artefacts that would be completed would be: 
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 An IT Balanced Scorecard aligned to the identified Strategic Objectives of the Business 
 Identification of key COBIT control measurements for protecting Critical Infrastructure. 
 
For all intensive purposes this activity could be overlooked and one could move directly to 
making assumptions relating to the security controls that the business expects IT to achieve 
however the purpose of this activity is to avoid assumptions.  IT must engage with Business 
to ensure expectations are understood but more importantly, this provides an opportunity for 
Business to understand the Cyber related risks against Critical Infrastructure and obtain their 
support from the beginning of the initiative. 
 
In the realm of IT Governance, the IT Balanced Score Card is central to strong governance 
and specifically aims to: 
 Ensure IT is aligned with the business in terms of its specific strategic objectives 
 Ensure that IT is an enabler to business, deriving maximum business value from the IT 
spend 
 IT resources are used responsibly 
 IT risks are managed and mitigated appropriately with awareness and evolvement with 
business. 
 
The principles of the balanced scorecard are to identify the businesses strategic objectives 
across the following four categories (Saull, 2000) as illustrated in Figure 5 (an example is 
given for illustrative purposes): 
1. Financial – The financial objectives of the organisation as it relates to profit and loss 
2. Customers – The focus of the company’s operation in relationship to ensuring positive 
customer poster 
3. Internal Business Process -   What are the key business processes that are paramount 
to business 
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4. Learning and Growth – What are key areas that business is required innovate to 
improve. 
 
Figure 5 - Example of an IT Balanced Scorecard (Badger, 2010) 
3.1.2. Map IT objectives to that of business 
As discussed during Section 3.1.1 the focus of IT should be specifically aligned to enabling 
the business to achieve its strategic objectives.  Researchers Ahuja and Goldman introduce 
the concept of an Info-Sec Balanced scorecard with the purpose of specifying specific 
security objectives to meet the business objectives (Ahuja & Goldman, 2009). They strongly 
believe that by doing so, Information Security Alignment is achieved by ensuring alignment 
between the Business, IT and Information Security. 
 
Table 4 depicts the proposed alignment between the different balanced scorecards: 
 
 Business Balanced 
Scorecard 
IT Balanced Scorecard InfoSec Balanced 
Scorecard 
Financial Perspective Provide a good return on 
investment of IT - 
enabled business 
investments. 
Improve IT’s Cost-efficiency 
and its contribution to business 
profitability 
Security should be used as 
an enabler to reduce cost 
and reduce complexity 
Customer Perspective Establish service 
continuity and 
availability 
Reduce solution and service 
delivery defects and rework 
Ensure security is 
incorporated in the design 
of services to reduce 
customer related breaches 
Internal Perspective 
 
 
Provide compliance with 
external laws, 
regulations and 
contracts. 
Ensure that critical and 
confidential information is 
withheld from those who 
should not have access to it 
Ensure security control 
achieve confidentiality, 
Integrity and availability 
Learning and Growth 
Perspective 
Acquire and maintain 
skilled and motivated 
people 
Acquire and maintain it skills 
that respond to the IT Strategy 
Ensure key security 
awareness is a priority of 
training 
Table 4 – Interpreted IT Balanced Scorecard Mapping to Business Scorecard (Ahuja & 
Goldman, 2009) 
The development of the Information Security component of Balanced Scorecard could be 
viewed as an evolution on the standard IT balanced scorecard and considered on the second 
iteration on the framework.  
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IT’s strategic objectives would essentially form the basis of the objectives for performing the 
initiative using the hybrid framework. The development of a business case to justify the 
initiative may be optional and developed as required since it may not always be relevant 
(budget and approval may have already been granted).  If it is required, the mappings 
performed during the balanced scorecard could be used as drivers for motivation.  The 
development of metrics (as discussed during Section 3.1.3) would be used to measure the 
overall success of the program to achieve the businesses strategic objectives. 
 
3.1.3. KPI’s through metrics 
Metrics enable the measurement of performance, ultimately identifying measurement of 
success or failure for security initiatives (Fleming & Goldstein, 2012).  It should be 
considered common sense that if proper metrics are not established upfront how can the 
success of an initiative be measured. 
 
Fleming and Goldstein suggest that metrics should measure reduction in Critical 
Infrastructure incidents and the damage caused by these incidents. Characteristics of metrics 
may be that they are quantitative, universally acceptable, obtainable, repeatable and time 
based in nature (Abbadi, 2006). While there may be specific metrics that are required to 
measure the success of this initiative, one should recognise that metrics probably already 
exist within the organisation in a form of security reporting. Where this does exist, it should 
be considered for inclusion within this initiative. 
  
Security metrics, should be designed to measure the derived benefit from the implementation 
of key security controls since it creates an opportunity for business to directly measure the 
benefit it derives from its IT Security investments, as well as enabling IT to communicate 
effectively with Senior Management (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2013). Furthermore it enables 
senior management to be part of the process in dealing with Information Security risks that 
should result in enabling the ability for the business to make key decisions in accepting or 
mitigating the identified risk (Tashi & Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2007). 
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Researchers Tashi and Ghernaouti-Hélie (2007) suggest that security metrics be aligned to 
organisational objectives, relevant to their current issues and quantifiable with associated 
costs. 
The process of presenting metrics should occur through three key phase as suggested by 
research (Wang, 2005): 
 collection 
 validation 
 processing. 
 
The actual creation of metrics is often achieved through the review and consolidation of logs 
collected from the environment. OWASP suggests identifying tools capable of collecting the 
appropriate logs as well as the appropriate IT team members who should be responsible for 
producing the necessary reports for IT management (OWASP, 2006).  Reports that are 
heavily worded in IT jargon are usually not well received by senior business management and 
therefore it should be the responsibility of a manager to ensure the reports are easily 
understood and displayed in a manner that relays the actual business risk. 
 
For this activity two main categories of metrics are envisaged, new metrics developed to 
measure the success of the initiative at hand and adoption of existing metrics that could be 
used to provide metrics to measure overall performance. 
 
Researcher Payne suggests developing agreed baselines and improvement targets for the 
metrics and even use best practise/peers to ensure that targets are realistic and achievable 
(2006). For the purposes of identifying the appropriate security metrics, it is suggested to 
refer to the SANS Top 20 security controls as a base for identifying the metrics for which 
Stimac’s examples could be selected as an appropriate base to work from. (Cain & Couture, 
2011; Stimac, 2013).  
 
Even when establishing a “baseline” it must consist of defined measurable criteria.  Some 
examples of metrics could include (Stimac, 2013): 
 Number of incidents causing unavailability of critical services 
 Number of incidents causing the loss of critical data 
 Number of detected incidents 
 Number of identified vulnerabilities 
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 Vulnerabilities that could not be remediated in 30 days. 
 
3.1.3.1. COBIT based metrics 
Another approach to metrics is the use of the COBIT framework, which could also be used to 
show control maturity through year to year measuring (another form of metrics). Through the 
use of the balanced scorecard, COBIT generic IT goals (Figure 6) could be mapped directly 
back to the Business objectives and as such by default the applicable IT Processes/COBIT 
control domains (have specific control descriptions across various levels of maturity) would 
be identified.  
 
Figure 6 - IT Goals mapped Processes (IT Governance Institute, 2007) 
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For illustration purposes DS5 of COBIT 4.1 is discussed below: 
 
DS5 – Ensure System Security 
Within DS5 there are 11 high level control objectives. Generally all may be applicable to 
most organisation but it must be noted that they are high level Control Objectives which still 
require an organisation to design the actual control implementation. 
 
An example taken directly from COBIT 4.1 is DS5.5 - Security Testing, Surveillance and 
Monitoring, suggests the following control objectives: 
 Test and monitor the IT security implementation in a proactive way 
 IT security should be reaccredited in a timely manner to ensure that the approved 
enterprise’s information security baseline is maintained 
 A logging and monitoring function will enable the early prevention and/or detection and 
subsequent timely reporting of unusual and/or abnormal activities that may need to be 
addressed. 
 
While considering the above objectives, the organisation would implement actual controls 
(designed specifically to their environment) to achieve the above. Yearly those controls 
would be audited against the high level control objectives and the following maturity level 
from COBIT would be utilised for assessing maturity of the implemented controls: 
 Level 0 - Non-existent when the organisation does not recognise the need for IT security 
 Level 1 - Initial/Ad Hoc when the organisation recognises the need for IT security 
 Level 2  - Repeatable but Intuitive when responsibilities and accountabilities for IT 
security are assigned to an IT security co-ordinator, although the management authority of 
the co-ordinator is limited 
 Level 3 - Defined when security awareness exists and is promoted by management and 
IT security procedures are defined and aligned with IT security policy 
 Level 4 - Managed and Measurable when responsibilities for IT security are clearly 
assigned, managed and enforced 
 Level 5 - Optimised when IT security is a joint responsibility of business and IT 
management and is integrated with corporate security business objectives. 
 
Since COBIT is universally accepted, it provides a recognised and mature option to define 
controls, measure control maturity and utilise them as metrics to measure success or failure.  
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3.1.4. Key CIIP control consideration 
  
Control metrics discussed during Section 3.1.3 would be measured off controls existing 
within a particular environment requiring controls to exist and to be measured.  Controls form 
a key component in the protection of Critical Infrastructure and the identification of key 
controls will aid in the protection there-of. During Section 2.9.3, various security controls 
were considered in the context of protecting Critical Infrastructure. Since controls may vary 
in suitability across various environments, the identification there-of should be prescriptive. 
As such, the list in Section 2.9.3 is prescriptive in nature and should be seen in the context of 
minimum baselines applicable to most environments.   
 
During Section 3.1.3, the use of Balanced Scorecard in conjunction with COBIT’s generic IT 
Processes also provides the opportunity to define high level control requirements.  Note that 
it is high level in nature compared to the prescriptive controls in Section 2.9.3.  During this 
activity consider the identification of such key controls as a guidelines during subsequent 
phases. 
 
3.1.5. Phase 1 Summary 
During this phase a number of key foundational activities would have been performed. The 
deliverables that should have been completed would have been the IT Balanced Scorecard 
which should have enabled the identification of the businesses strategic objectives and aided 
in aligning IT objectives (operational and security), an essential component to the success of 
any initiative. 
 
The identification of potential controls if aligned to the Balanced Scorecard would be “fit for 
purpose” and ultimately provide measurable metrics to indicate project success or failure. 
The consideration of security controls that will enable the protection of Critical Infrastructure 
should be seen as descriptive and not prescriptive in nature, since at this stage it would be 
premature to dictate specific controls, especially since no existing controls would have been 
reviewed.  
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In summary, once all phases of this framework have been completed, success or failure will 
need to be measured.  Using the above, consider the balance between using existing metrics 
and developing new metric to measure success or failure.   
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3.2. Phase 2 - Identify Critical Infrastructure 
 
During the Phase 1 (Section 3.1), the activities listed would have identified the businesses 
strategic objectives along with the IT’s strategic objectives aligned to the business, with the 
option iteration in the identification of the InfoSec security objectives.  As input to Phase 2, 
the Phase 1 objectives must drive the agenda in the identification of Critical Infrastructure. 
 
Phase 2 is of strategic importance since the scope of the assessment and remediation will be 
defined.  The process of how Critical Infrastructure is identified creates a direct opportunity 
to engage with Business, which if correctly facilitated will result in their involvement and 
ultimately their support of the initiatives going forward (Waters, 2007). 
 
The activities for this phase strive to achieve a Top-Down approach that enables the 
identification of key business processes/services that will result in the identification of the 
underlying Critical Infrastructure required to be protected. 
1. Perform Cyber Threat Assessment with Business and IT 
2. Perform Business Impact Assessment using the Threat and Risk vectors identified 
3. Identify Critical Infrastructure and key interdependencies 
4. Agree scope as identified during the previous activity with the business. 
 
The key artefacts for this phase are described below with the motivation and included 
activities described per activity: 
 Cyber Threat modelling (Section 3.2.1) 
 Business Impacts Assessment (Section 3.2.2) 
 Identification of CII interdependencies (Section 3.2.3) 
 Scope of CIIP assessment and remediation. (Section 3.2.4). 
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Figure 7 - Potential Threat Actors (International Telecommunications Union, 
2011) 
3.2.1. Perform Cyber Threat Assessment  
 
The objective of the Threat assessment is to identify the potential threats applicable to CI 
whether they be natural, human or environmental, its causes and the potential impact on CI 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (Dunn & Wigert, 2004). Risk and Threat 
assessments are usually performed in series however in context of this methodology the 
Threat assessment output is envisaged to be utilised as context to the Business Impact Risk 
Assessment discussed in the next Section. 
The identification and vetting of the threat vectors (or actors) is not an IT responsibility but 
rather a joint responsibility between Business and IT. A key component of understanding the 
risks businesses faces through an attack on CI, is to understand where possible attacks may 
originate from. This will provide the ability to better understand and analyse the potential 
threats, while associating potential threats with potential consequences (Mateski et al., 2012).   
 
 
 
Potential “threat actors”, depicted in Figure 7,  are referenced by Von Solms (2013) to 
include cyber threat sources such as Foreign Intelligence Services, disgruntled employees, 
extremist Organisations, hacktivists , organised Crime Groups and investigative journalists. 
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security published threat 
landscape suggests threats  to corporations include Competing Corporations, Cybercriminals, 
Employees, Hacktivists, Nation states and Terrorists (ENISA, 2013).  
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Understanding and applying threats metrics is often considered a rather immature practise, 
rather in overzealous measurement or none at all (Mateski et al., 2012). While the process of 
performing a Threat Assessment may not be an exact science, it should be seen as iterative 
and something is always better than nothing especially if it aids in awareness and 
acknowledgement for the initiatives at hand. 
 
Van Solmns (2013) suggests the followings two key activities key in performing a Threat 
Assessment: 
1. Estimate the Actors Capability – This would be focused specifically on an External 
Threat Assessment and would consider an Actors ability to exploit vulnerabilities to 
breach security in the context of a worst case scenario 
2. Estimate the Threats Actors Motivation – This would consider factors driving 
motivation to breach security in the context of using the worst case motivation of any 
influencing Threat Source. 
 
Across Actor Capability and Maturity, Von Solms (2013) suggests the following levels of 
risk and motivations that be considered when performing the threat modelling: 
 Capability  Motivation 
Level 0 Opportunistic attacks No interest in attacking the system 
 
Level 1 Opportunistic attacks May casually investigate or attack a system if 
exposed to it, but not by design 
Level 2 Some IT knowledge and resources for basic attacks (including 
the use of free malware, non-zero type attacks) 
Actor will attempt to attack the system; but one 
person attack; part-time 
Level 3 Considerable IT knowledge however actors lack the capability 
and resources to implement sophisticated attacks 
Focused on the system; full-time attacker; with 
support from part-timers 
Level 4 Very capable with the resources to execute sophisticated 
attacks using zero-day exploits involving significant 
customisation 
Attack system frequently or constantly; several 
people; bribe or coerce 
Level 5 Sophisticated attacks, well-funded and resourced. Absolute priority employing detailed research 
in conjunction with social engineering, bribery 
and coercion 
Table 5 - Capability/Motivation (Von Solms, 2013) 
Figure 8 describes the associated risk rating by combining the motivation and capability level 
to identify the potential actors over threat potential (refer to specific diagrams through use of 
figure numbers): 
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Figure 8 - Threat Table Measurement (Von Solms, 2013) 
 
In completion of this phase all threats actors would be rated against the above risk matrix as 
to identify possible threats actors used in the subsequent phase. Ensuring business 
involvement is key in achieving buy in as well as accuracy in performing the threat modelling 
and it is suggested that the modelling be performed through workshops with key stakeholders 
represented by Business and IT (Paul, 2013).   
3.2.2. Business Impact Assessments  
The Business Impact Assessment is adopted from Business Continuity Management leading 
practise (IBM, 2014). Is was specifically selected since it has a strong business focus and 
provides a top down approach in identifying Business/IT dependencies. 
 
The Business Impact Assessment provides two direct outputs: 
 Provide the identification of the key business processes and their underlying dependency 
on IT, while identifying assets that require the greatest level of protection (IBM, 2014) 
 Provide insights into the planning of responses to various cyber related situations 
(Scarfone, Grance, & Masone, 2012). 
 
The common activities (at a high level) that occur in completing the Business Impact 
Assessment are: 
 Identification of key processes per department. This would include identifying the 
Recovery Time Objectives (“RTO”) for each key processes (RTO is how long a process 
can be down before an unacceptable amount of impact is experienced). The type of 
impact will be categorised either as Financial, Infrastructure related, HSEQ and 
Reputational/Legal 
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 Mapping and the identification of key systems/infrastructure that support key business 
processes/services and the defined RTO’s that would be identified 
 Process dependencies are identified with external/internal departments/organisations. 
 
These activities provide the context for identifying, at a high level, the key business processes 
and services, as well as the businesses reliance from a system/service perspective. There is 
much research available suggesting methodologies aiding in the identification of Critical 
Infrastructure, however many of these focus specifically on identifying interdependencies 
within Critical Infrastructure and between externally dependant infrastructures.   
 
The above approach is tangible and feasible in quickly identifying an organisations Critical 
Infrastructure through the identification of key processes/services that are underpinned 
through technology. During Section 3.2.3, the activities performed during this section will 
form the basis for the final activities for Phase 2. 
3.2.3. Identify CI related infrastructure and dependencies 
The CIIP handbook provides various approaches to identifying Critical Infrastructure (which 
are discussed in more detail during this section) and what is critical during this phase is to not 
exclude key infrastructure as this may result in infrastructure with vulnerabilities being 
potentially exploited.  
 
During this phase business dependencies should be mapped to systems/infrastructure as to 
identify Critical Infrastructure.  To achieve this, it is suggested to utilise the ISA 99 stack to 
identifying infrastructure that may potentially be at risk. Consideration for the use of the ISA 
99 topology structure for the identification of Critical Infrastructure provides a structured 
approach for infrastructure identification.  It is suggested to specifically exclude Level 0 
infrastructure since it may be possible and more beneficial to secure from Level 1 upwards 
while potentially logically securing Level 0. As such Level 0 devices should be specifically 
excluded from the scope of the assessment. 
 
By establishing the “link” between key business processes/services that business provides 
and Critical Infrastructure aligned to ISA 99 stack, potential high risk business dependencies 
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are quickly identified. Figure 9 depicts the presentation of the interdependencies using the 
ISA 99 approach as discussed in this Section. 
 
Substantiating risk for the environment will be performed during the subsequent phases 
during which vulnerabilities are identified.  The costs of securing infrastructure .vs the 
potential impact is something that will aid in the exclusion of the scope items. 
 
 
There are other approaches to identifying Critical Infrastructure including the VAF 
framework (see Figure 10) as well as many other as discussed in CIIP handbook (Dunn & 
Wigert, 2004).   
 
Figure 10 - CIIP Handbook - Identifying Critical Infrastructure(Dunn & Wigert, 2004) 
The approach suggested (aligned to ISA99) for use in this framework would achieve the same 
results as the VAF framework and those suggested in CIIP, since they follow a similar logical 
Identification of facilities 
Map system, data and 
information architecture  in 
context of the organisations  
resources specifically 
•Major applications 
•General support systems 
• Sensitivity of information handled 
• Interfaces and information sharing 
Link physical, organisational 
and architectural 
components to the core 
processes has identified 
during the BIA. 
Figure 9 - ISA 99 Stacked Level Approach (Pollet, 2011) 
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flow but are obviously aligned to the above activities.  Figure 11 displays the mapping of key 
business processes to that of key applications (refer to Section 3.2.2) which in turn is mapped 
to underlying infrastructure. This would aid in the identification of the scope for Phase 3 and 
require detailed topology diagrams to identify all infrastructure for inclusion within. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Example of Process to Infrastructure Mapping 
3.2.4. Agree scope and approach with the business 
Having identified the Critical Infrastructure scope that will form the scope for Phase 3 
(Section 3.3), the actual scope and approach for the assessment should be agreed assessment 
(to be performed during Section 3.2.5) with the business.  Pieth (2004) suggests that budgets 
are generally the determining factor as to scope and approach of the assessments however 
suggests the following hierarchy of activities: 
 Operational risk assessment 
 Lab assessment 
 Component testing 
 Technical documentation review 
 Functionality and configuration review 
 Production assessment 
 Technical documentation review 
 Staff interviews 
 Functionality and configuration review  
 End-to-end penetration assessment. 
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While the above approach is aligned to ICS environments which by discussion/definition are 
well suited to Critical Infrastructure, it follows a risk based approach which is illustrated by 
the consideration of Lab assessment testing (item two on the list) before penetration (items 
ten on the list, the motivation for performing this test last is discussed in Section 3.3.2).   
 
During Phase 3 (Section 3.3) an approach should be considered that is fit for purpose to the 
environment being evaluated and as such Pieth’s guidelines should be used only as guideline 
and not as the de facto approach. 
 
 
3.2.5. Phase 2 Summary 
The outcome of the activities during the Phase 2 would have produced the following key 
artefacts: 
 Cyber Threat modelling including the identification of actors 
 Business Impacts Assessment, identifying key business processes that may be affected by 
a Cyber Attacks on CI 
 Identification of CI interdependencies 
 Scope and approach to assess CI during the subsequent phases. 
Phase 1 and 2 activities have most been discovery in nature, with the aim of identifying the 
scope and approach for following Phase, Assess & Analyse risk. The bulk of the activity will 
now take phase during the Phase 3. 
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3.3. Phase 3 - Assess and analyse risk 
This phase is dedicated to identifying vulnerabilities/deficiencies associated with the in scope 
Critical Infrastructure.  The intention is to identify vulnerabilities and substantiating the risks 
associated with relevant vulnerabilities.  One would be testing controls that would generally 
fall within the Technical, Management and Operational control domains. 
 
The term vulnerabilities would be utilised for issues of a technical nature, with deficiencies 
rather describing Operational/Management related issues.  Controls across these domains will 
either directly or indirectly contribute to the security posture of the environment, with a key 
objective being the ability to identify the security risks associated within the scope of Critical 
Infrastructure (and supporting systems) as identified during Phase 2 (Section 3.3).  
 
Dunn and Wigert (2004) suggest that a risk assessment should analyse the probability of 
loss/damage resulting from potential threats. The consideration for the materialising of threats 
should be considered in context of the existing vulnerabilities/deficiencies and should achieve 
coverage across what could go wrong (scenario), the likelihood and the subsequent 
consequences (impact). 
 
In answering what can go wrong (scenario) one would have to understand where the security 
vulnerabilities exist impacting the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of infrastructure 
as a result of potential deficient controls. This will require one to assess the likelihood of 
what vulnerabilities may be exploited as well as the consequences that may arise. 
 
The CIPP handbook (The United States Government, 2000) suggests five examples of 
vulnerability assessment frameworks/methodologies for assessing Critical Infrastructure. The 
two selected from the CIPP handbook are United States Department of Energy (“DoE”, refer 
to Section 3.3.1) and Vulnerability Assessment Framework (“VAF”, refer to Section 3.3.2) 
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since they both provide extensive audit program guidelines (audit procedures enabling the 
identification of control weaknesses) which are modular in nature and are suitable for 
hybridisation.  
 
During this section positive elements are selected from each methodology to provide an 
improved approach. One must consider again that this is merely a guideline and the user may 
substitute alternate options the approach.  
 
3.3.1. VAF Framework 
The VAF framework (Pieth, 2004) was developed by Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
and selected for hybridisation with the DoE vulnerability framework specifically for it 
objective of ensuring that Critical Infrastructure vulnerabilities were identified for both cyber 
related risks, traditional physical risks and its suitability for use by large government 
organisations as well as small government departments with no prior experience in 
infrastructure vulnerability assessments (Marwick, 1998). 
 
The VAF framework consists of 3 high level phases of which the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 phases are 
chosen as key high-level sub phase activities for use during Phase 3: 
 
Figure 12 - VAF Framework (Homeland Security, 2013) 
3.3.2. DoE framework 
The scope of activities within the Assessment and Post Assessment phases were selected as 
guidelines within the specific  VAF activity headings (Gather data to identify vulnerabilities 
& analyse and prioritise vulnerabilities) since their activities are well described enabling 
easier activity identification. The Figure 13 illustrates the DoE’s scope to performing its 
Assessment and Post Assessment activities. 
 
Define 
minimum 
essential 
infrastructure 
Gather data to 
identify 
vulnerabilities 
Analyse and 
Prioritise 
vulnerabilities 
In Scope 
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The DOE’s Pre-Assessment phase have been mostly covered during Phase 1 and 2 (sub 
section 3.1 & 3.2), specifically the Define objectives and Scope of Assessment having been 
covered during Phase 2, and is therefore excluded. The Establish Information Protection 
Procedures would be specifically covered during the Phase 4 (sub section 3.4) and one would 
challenge the benefit of performing that activity now since we are yet to establish the 
potential vulnerabilities and associated risks and impacts. The Identify and Rank Critical 
Assets activity would largely have been achieved but from a business perspective through the 
identification of the process/service RTO’s and subsequent mapping to ISA 99 level 4 (and 
below) Critical Infrastructure stacks, with underlying infrastructure specifics very much 
absent at this stage.   
 
 
For the activities listed under the DOE’s Post Assessment phase, one would envisage many of 
these activities (namely Lessons Learnt, Best practise developed and Training Conducted) 
would best be performed during Phase 4 (Section 3.4) since the ability to develop “fit for 
purpose” content may only be realised after remediation activities are completed. It should 
also be noted that some recommendations may actually not be feasible and alternate 
recommendations may need to be agreed. 
 
Incorporated into 
VAF -> Gather data 
to identify 
vulnerabilities 
 
 
Incorporated into 
VAF -> Analyse and 
prioritise 
vulnerabilities 
Figure 13 - DoE Framework (Dunn & Wigert, 2004) 
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As such the following hybrid approach to Phase 3 is suggested: 
 Gather Data to identify vulnerabilities 
 Analyse Network Architecture  
 Assess Threat Environment  
 Conduct Penetration Testing  
 Assess Physical Security  
 Conduct Physical Asset Analysis 
 Assess Operation's Security  
 Examine Policies and Procedures  
 Analyses and Prioritise 
 Conduct Impact Analysis 
 Assess Infrastructure Interdependencies  
 Conduct Risk Characterization. 
 
 
3.3.3. Gather and Identify Vulnerabilities 
The Gather and Identify Vulnerabilities is the first activity envisaged for Phase 3. The ability 
to achieve “quick wins” are discussed for key domains and procedures, as aligned to the 
activities within Gather and Identify Vulnerabilities, which as per the hybrid approach 
consists of the list of testing within the DOE Assessment phase (refer to Section 3.3.2)   
 
Both the DoE and the VAF framework provide audit based questions that are sufficiently 
generic to be applicable to most environments which can be used as guidelines for audit 
activities (Department of Energy, 2002; Pieth, 2004). 
 
During Section 3.3.3.1, challenges to key areas of testing are discussed with guidelines aimed 
in reducing the risk in identifying CI vulnerabilities considering that many of this systems are 
live and impacting the operational environment is not an option as a result of testing. 
 
One should consider that testing on live CI can potentially affect the availability of the 
systems resulting in failure or a system “unknown state”. Pieth suggests that prior to 
exploiting a vulnerability, CI administrators should fully understand the context of the issue 
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and the ability to segregate that component from the main system or the ability to test the 
exploitation of vulnerability in a lab environment should be considered. Consideration for the 
ISA 99 infrastructure stack in context of where the greatest risk lies should form the basis of 
the testing strategy.  Working on a Level 0 bus (actual infield devices) may result in direct 
production issues as those devices are very sensitive to the network traffic and be more 
susceptible for the testing performed. They are also generally better segregated from other 
networks and therefore testing at that level provides little value. 
 
Breaking down the activities per level and halting the penetration test at the agreed level may 
reduce the risk around testing. It may also be prudent to involve the vendor during the 
assessments as device related vulnerabilities will need to be remediated by the vendor (as 
source code may not be available for debugging). Furthermore, Pieth suggests that by 
involving the vendor during the assessment they may be willing to share otherwise 
unavailable information making the assessment more successful (Gellings, Caskey, & 
Russell, 2010; Pieth, 2004). 
 
3.3.3.1. Conduct Penetration Testing  
A key consideration in the approach to improving ones overall security is from the Cyber 
Security Assessments of Industrial Control Systems Good Practice Guide which suggests that 
non-intrusive methods be utilised for assessing production ICS environments (Pieth, 2004). 
 
To this point the DoE framework suggests the following 4 key activities during this phase: 
 Defining the rules of engagement (ROE) – This would include establishing the scope of 
testing, start time & date, specific exclusions 
 Establishing a white cell – This is essentially a team of “insiders” consisting of resources 
performing the testing as well as resources from the organisation. It provides an 
opportunity to ensure that key people within the organisation are aware of the test without 
letting anyone know since the ability to test the detection aspects of infrastructure could 
still be achieved this way 
 Designing and conducting the test (Methodology) – This is an essential component of 
the actual penetration test.  Deciding the scenario of attack is valuable for its potential to 
ensure the penetration test is a representation of a “real world” event.  Types of scenarios 
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would include outside threats, Insider threats and associated 3
rd
 parties.  The activities 
within the methodology are discussed in further detail during this Section.  
 Writing the Final Report – The greatest challenge with writing a suitable report is the 
ability to ensure that identified vulnerabilities are written in a manner that is suitable for 
business to understand as well as ensuring that the recommendations are fit for purpose 
and perhaps incorporate a staged implementation in the context of risk (should they be 
extensive in nature). 
 
If an organisation is planning on performing a penetration test for the first time without 
having performed any vulnerability assessments, it may be prudent to first initiate a 
vulnerability assessment and remediate them prior to performing the penetration test. 
Furthermore, penetration testing is expensive since the resources are specialised in nature and 
the ability to perform these activities effectively internally would prove a challenge. 
 
It should also be considered that a penetration test may introduce risk to the availability of 
systems especially in ICS type environments and as such vulnerability assessment will still 
identify vulnerabilities while reducing the risk associated with Penetration testing (Pieth, 
2004).  
 
Another key point to consider, is that most organisations can effectively perform a 
vulnerability assessment with existing in-house resources. Which also provides for a cost 
effective approach to identifying vulnerabilities and facilitates an environment where budget 
could rather be allocated for remediation. A concern against only performing a vulnerability 
assessment is that a vulnerability assessment report shows vulnerabilities and the potential 
risk of exploitation but in certain instances it does not in itself provide absolute confirmation 
(vulnerabilities with unknown exploits often found in applications) that vulnerabilities will 
lead to exploitation (resulting in doubt as the criticality identified).  This could also be 
applied to penetration testing which in itself does not prove that every vulnerability was 
identified and every vulnerability was tested for the possibility of exploitation.  It is a 
common view within the security community that support for a finding stemming from a 
successful exploit obtains more support than that of a vulnerability assessment. 
 
Perhaps a perform middle ground would be an iterative approach to this challenge by having 
an organisation build towards full penetration testing. Based on my experience Footprinting 
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should be the first stage in identifying the potential target environments and in a penetration 
testing approach that has many iterations, (refer to Figure 14) foot printing activity preceding 
the actual exploitation is viable. 
 
Figure 14 –Penetration Testing Methodology (Gupta & Kaur, 2013) 
Penetration testing is generally an advanced skill performed by highly specialised individuals, 
who are very often in short supply (Rosewarne, 2013). Furthermore it is unlikely that many 
organisation have the ability to perform this aspect of technical testing in-house, as such it is 
advised to outsource this aspect of testing. Consideration of an outsourced providers who has 
experience in ICS related systems should be key especially in the context of the risks 
associated with the penetration testing of ICS systems. 
 
 
Approaches to Penetration testing 
When performing a penetration test on ICS environments it often suggested that grey box 
testing is most effective.  Most organisations would prefer a “black box” type approach to the 
penetration testing as it traditionally meets “regulatory self-assessments requirements” 
however Pieth indicates that effective testing would require knowledge of the environment 
and as such one should “plan for the worst” and provide as much detail as possible or is 
feasible resulting in “grey box” testing (Pieth, 2004). 
 
Pieth indicates that metrics are important to understanding or rather quantifying the risks 
associated with vulnerabilities and advocates the CVSS as a “standardised method of scoring 
vulnerabilities in a way that represents the risk to an individual organisation’s unique 
environment”. The CVSS framework is also free and provides additional tools which aid in 
risk rating vulnerabilities. 
 
Footprint 
Identify 
Vulnerablities 
Remediate Footprint Remediate 
Penetration 
testing 
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3.3.3.2. Examine Policies and Procedures 
Effective Policies and Procedures are the foundation of any strong security environments. 
Researcher Fernandez (2005) identifies a number key security controls aimed to improve 
SCADA related infrastructure of which strong policies was the 2
nd
 control encouraged.   
 
The challenge with policies and procedures is that it will dictate the general security posture 
of the overall environment. Consider the lack of policies and standards relating to how 
servers are baselined within an environment. Baselines can be very subjective and as such 
configurations should be performed through the use of fit-for-purpose security baselines.  
This also provides a “yard” stick for vulnerability assessment/penetration testing phase as the 
ability to identify vulnerabilities that should have been resolved by the agreed security 
baseline often indicates the failure of key security processes. 
 
The DoE describes seven key steps of which only critical key activities are considered and 
discussed below: 
 Examination and review of the organisation document repository as to identify the policy 
and procedure gaps. Specific focus must be placed on the review of documents relating to 
Information Security related documents (acceptable use, information security, other 
related processes and procedures. 
 A site visit should be performed to view the adherence to policies and procedures 
performed during business as usual activities with a view to identify additional policies 
and procedures that may aid to improve the overall security posture 
 Interview key staff across demographics should be performed to gauge to adherence to 
policies and general awareness of their existence. 
3.3.4. Analyse and prioritise 
The final activity within Phase 3 – Analyse and prioritise will ultimately set the remediation 
scope for Phase 4 - Implement Risk Management Activities (refer to subset 3.4). As per the 
hybrid approach, the objective for this activity is to review findings and make 
recommendations through the following key activities: 
• Conduct Impact Analysis 
• Assess Infrastructure Interdependencies  
• Conduct Risk Characterization. 
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During these activities recommendations should consider that since most environments are 
live, the ability to implement remediation actions may be limited and heavily dependent on 
maintenance windows. Furthermore specifically with CI, vendors would need to be engaged 
to discuss the remediation’s and ensure that any potential changes will not impact CIA and as 
well as SLA’s. The biggest challenge to these activities are understanding the infrastructure 
interdependencies & assessing the risk, as such these two activities are expanded. 
3.3.4.1. Assess Infrastructure Interdependencies 
DoE describes the assessment of Infrastructure Interdependencies as “physical and electronic 
(cyber) linkages” with the focus on the identification of Critical Infrastructure that supports 
critical facilities.  It creates the context for identifying infrastructure that may have greater 
direct impact/dependencies on other processes/infrastructure/organisations which in itself is 
often CI’s greatest weakness – making this activity vitally important (Collier & Lakoff, 
2008). Identifying interdependencies has always been a challenge due to the very often 
complex environments and their breadth of reach (Jiaotong, 2009). 
 
There are many suggested approaches to identifying CI interdependencies with the PreDict 
Interdependency Analysis (Refer to Figure 15) approach providing a simple yet effective 
manner in identifying interdependencies (specifically where Cyber world and physical meet) 
(Dunn & Wigert, 2004). The actual interdependency model is quite simplistic but that in itself 
is valuable and represents interdependencies in a grid format with different levels of detail 
that could be utilised with individual Critical Infrastructure components mapped to depict 
their interdependencies. 
 
Another dependency mapping approach suggested by CIIP, is the Process and Technology 
analysis approach as depicted in Figure 16. This approach follows a 4 layer approach to 
dependency mapping – Core Functions, Infrastructure, Information & communication 
infrastructure and a sector based view. It differs from the Predict approach, in that it 
incorporates a more detailed mapping of dependencies (almost as much detail as the approach 
suggested in Figure 11). 
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Figure 15 - The PreDict Interdependency Analysis  (Dunn & Wigert, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 - Process and Technology analysis (Dunn & Wigert, 2004) 
 
The Italian Cyber Security Report of 2013 (Marco, Arcuri, Baldoni, Ciccotelli, & Di Luna, 
2013) considers six different dimensions to infrastructure interdependency analysis: 
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 Environment – condition of each environment 
 Type of interdependencies – Physical, cyber, geographic and logical  
 State of operation – effect during normal operating hours, times of disruptions or during 
repair 
 Infrastructure characteristics 
 Type of failures – whether interdependencies could be the cause of failure 
 Degree of connexion – number of interdependencies which may create the intensity for 
failure. 
  
The incorporation of the above dimensions into either of the suggested approaches may aid in 
fully understanding the characteristics of CI dependencies enabling a deeper understanding of 
the challenge at hand.  One must considers that one of the suggested approaches may be more 
applicable to an organisation and as such the framework provides this flexibility based on the 
requirements. 
 
In summary consider the Process and Technology approach (refer to Figure 16) for complex 
environment with Predict(Dunn & Wigert, 2004), refer to Figure 15, for simpler 
environments. Utilise the Italian Cyber Security reports (Marco et al., 2013) suggested 
dimensions where applicable within either approach. 
3.3.4.2. Conduct Impact Analysis & Risk Characterisation 
 
Impact Analysis and the Risk Characterisation as per the DoE framework were independent 
activities occurring at different phases through the approach. We have combined the activities 
to occur in a parallel manner as well as conduct them as part of the analyse and prioritise 
phase. 
 
The context for this activity is to ensure that all potential technical, operational and 
management related deficiencies identified have an appropriate risk and potential impact 
rating so that a roadmap can be developed during Phase 4 (Section 3.4).  
 
DoE suggests that the impact analysis should help to estimate the impact that a potential 
outage may have and suggests this as the “introduction” to risk characterization.  DoE 
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mandates the use of quantitative formulas to estimate the impact however in the context of 
Critical  
 Infrastructure, dependency risks should also be considered and that may be challenging to 
identify the quantitative estimates (refer to Figure 17 for an example of the DoE Risk 
Characterisation).  Ultimately the exercise results in the weight of expenditure to mitigate the 
vulnerability vs the risk (Department of Energy, 2002). 
Figure 17 - DoE Risk Characterisation (Department of Energy, 2002) 
The DoE risk characterisation framework is comprehensive and aids in objectively 
prioritising the recommendations resulting from the assessment. The framework builds upon 
the preceding phases using the specifically identified vulnerabilities, organisation specific 
threats (as developed during Section 3.2.1), and potential impacts when combining the two. 
 
While security related risk criteria are quite specific, it is valuable to align the risk rating to 
those of the organisation’s Enterprise Risk Framework (“ERF”) ratings.  This facilitates for 
the universal understand for the potential risks. Furthermore the ERF rating will be aligned to 
the financial losses applicable to either level of risk. 
ENISA’s approach to national level Risk Assessments is depicted in Figure 18, which 
provides an alternate approach to achieving Conduct Impact Analysis & Conduct Risk 
Characterisation objectives. Vulnerabilities are covered in a technical and non-technical 
manner along with the discussion of threats, although these are limited to Cyber related in 
nature and therefore by default exclude the force majeure type events.   
 
This approach may prove more applicable since it considers key outputs created during the 
previous phases (Threats –Section 3.2.1 & Vulnerabilities –Section 3.3.3) and is less 
quantitative in nature, which may be more valuable in immature environments.  
 
One of the suggested approaches by ENISA as to the creation of scenarios, is the UK’s 
approach which suggests scenarios based on casualties, fatalities, economic harm, social 
disruption and psychological impact (Trimintzios & Gavrila, 2013). 
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The risk assessment would consider all inputs (as per Figure 18) as to understand the true 
risks associated with vulnerabilities identified, while taking into account the 
impact/likelihood of the scenarios materialising.  
 
 
Figure 18 - ENISA National Level Risk Assessment (Trimintzios & Gavrila, 2013) 
 
Regardless of which approach is chosen, they activities are key since they provide important 
context to Phase 4 (Section 3.4) which includes the development of a remediation roadmap. 
The risk and impact ratings created during the above activities will help ensure the roadmap 
correctly prioritises based on risk. 
3.3.5. Phase 3 Summary  
Phase 3 objectives are to identify vulnerabilities and analyse them for remediation. A key 
activity for this phase was to quantify the risk associated with the identified vulnerabilities as 
well identify key infrastructure interdependencies, a key activity in reducing Critical 
Infrastructure interdependency risks. Furthermore, ensuring these activities were conclusively 
performed is key as anything that was overlooked will not be remediated during Phase 4. 
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3.4. Phase 4 - Implement Risk Management Activities 
 
 
During the preceding phase, phase 3, vulnerabilities across various domains were identified 
and the priorities for remediation agreed based on the identified vulnerabilities.  At a high 
level NIPP describes the following activity domains relating to this phase: 
 Identify, Deter, Detect ,Disrupt  and Prepare for Threats and Hazards  
 Reduce vulnerabilities 
 Mitigate Consequences. 
The challenge with this phase if not what to do but rather how to go about doing it.  Often 
remediation efforts are required to be performed in a stacked approach to ensure that they 
don’t reoccur. An illustrative example would be vulnerabilities relating to patching.  If a 
vulnerability assessment is performed and vulnerabilities are identified relating to patching 
issues, remediating the vulnerability by patching would be a point in time fix however as new 
patches are released, unless a patching process is implemented its likely vulnerabilities will 
re-occur. As such the Phase 4 activities differ from that of NIPP, DoE and VaF which 
specifically aim to remediate identified vulnerabilities in the scope of the initiative as a point 
in time exercise. 
 
Security consulting firm Ciber suggests that it’s “time for operationally mature security 
solutions that address multiple security risks with systemic fixes that permanently reduce 
risk” (Bassett, 2008). Organisations should appreciate that remediation is not an exact science 
and remediation may overrun in both time and budget. DoE suggests that remediation plans 
should include timelines, staffing assignments and associated budgets.  
 
When developing roadmaps, a key consideration is that remediation activities may have 
interdependencies and efforts should be spent to try and identify them so prioritisation can be 
as accurate as possible. Consideration should also be given to focus on the quick wins that 
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provide improved risk reduction and improved security with the least amount of effort and 
cost. 
 
The roadmap should attempt to go beyond this by setting about positive change in how 
security is embedded in the organisation which could be achieved through the establishment 
of a Security Transformation Program.  As such Phase 4 objectives are as follows: 
 Initiate a program to bring about the overall improved change in the Cyber Security 
posture 
 Ensure that the security culture of the organisation changes 
 Ensure the program is design and structured to achieve change with key strategic sub 
projects. 
 
3.4.1. Establishment of a Security Evolution Program 
The greatest challenge during remediation activities is for individual projects to lose 
momentum and to avoid this it may be required to establish a Security Evolution Program 
which is responsible for driving remediation activities through existing organisational 
structures.  
 
Consideration of the challenges facing Security Transformation Programs would be valuable 
in ensuring success by not repeating the same errors. Consulting firm Deloitte (2008) 
suggests the following key challenges which Security Transformation initiatives face: 
 Lack of common vision 
 Lack of buy-in from stakeholders 
 Immature delivery of capabilities 
 Information overload. 
 
To limit the potential for these risks to materialise the following key principles should be 
adhered to during the establishment of a program (Godfrey, 2008): 
 A steering committee should be established consisting of key stakeholders from Business 
and IT. They should be responsible for on-boarding strategic resources, establishing the 
Project Management Structure, reporting guidelines, establish and prioritise the delivery 
of a roadmap 
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 A detailed charter should be established identifying the responsibilities, benefits and 
mandate of the program 
 The consideration for the inclusion of external security consultants with key expertise 
would improve the success for the transformation initiatives, especially if existing skills 
within the organisation are lacking.  
 
One should also consider that there will be various projects within the security transformation 
program. Remediation’s can be viewed in the short term as to mitigate existing risks but in 
the long term to ensure control robustness. Controls requiring similar remediation or rather 
remediation involving the same root cause can be grouped together to form sub project. The 
objective of this activity is to work through the vulnerabilities identified and confirm an 
appropriate project home which ultimately will develop and remediate a solution within the 
sub projects.  
 
Owners for each project within the program should be identified and should be required to 
report back to the program steering committee. The steering committee will ultimately be 
responsible for approving program budgets (which will consist of project budgets) and will 
be responsible for reporting back to executives on the progress of the program. 
 
The associated risks and potential impact of the identified deficiencies should aid the steering 
committee prioritise project budgets and resources and agree the subsequent program 
timelines (and the detailed projects). The establishment of sub projects is discussed in Section 
3.4.2. 
3.4.2. Establish projects 
Each project within the transformation program would have very different requirements and 
therefore require different skills. To ensure consistency is structure, reporting and quality, 
each project should align to an appropriate project governance structure.   
 
A proposed project methodology (refer to Figure 19) was selected from the SANS institute 
since has a strong review component within it and is based on the established 4 step project 
methodology (Rodgers, 2002). It should also be noted that the approach suggested is generic 
where possible and may not be applicable to all project or initiatives. 
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Figure 19 - SANS Project Methodology (Rodgers, 2002) 
3.4.2.1. Concept phase 
The Concept phase is responsible for establishing the project along with the high-level scope. 
A key output in this phase is the development of a business case which is approved along 
with the creation of the project charter (It may not be always necessary to develop a business 
case due to the pre-existing program). 
3.4.2.2. Requirements phase 
The project requirements phase is key since it defines what the project must achieve. During 
this phase all stakeholders, business process engineers, and analysts must all be engaged with 
the project manager and IT as to define the requirements. 
3.4.2.3. Analysis and Design Phase 
From across the organisation engineers and business must engage with one another to work 
through the identified vulnerabilities and establish the required future state. If the remediation 
requires the implementation of tools then a Technical design specifications should be created. 
3.4.2.4. Execution Phase 
This phase is made up of 4 sub activities: 
 Build phase – this phase sees the creation/modification or remediation of vulnerabilities. 
Persons with the appropriate skills should be developing a solution to ensure it meets the 
requirements 
 Test phase – This would be the natural progression for the proposed remediation activity 
to transition into QA or a staging area. A full test plan (integration, system, regression, 
performance testing) will occur during this time 
 Implementation phase – Once all testing is complete, the final remediation/initiatives 
are promoted to the production environment 
 Post Implementation phase – During this phase the changes must be monitored, defects 
logged and resolved. 
Concept Phase 
Requirements 
Phase 
Analysis and 
Design Phase 
Execution Phase 
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3.4.3. Phase 4 Summary 
The ability to remediate environments is very often better achieved through an effective 
Security Transformation Program. Key is effectivity grouping the remediation of 
vulnerabilities into key projects within a Security Evolutionary Program.  This provides a 
structured approach to implementing and monitoring remediation while providing structured 
and documented reporting to senior management.  
 
3.5. Phase 5 - Measure effectiveness 
 
 
 
The NIPP methodology describes the final phase as the process of “measuring effectiveness” 
as being a process that should evaluate the achievement of objectives through the 
measurement of the collected data as to assess progress of the objectives.  During Phase 1 
(Section 3.4), goals and objectives would have been established in the form of metrics.  It 
was also discussed that the process of measuring metrics for success consists of the three 
phases, Collection, Validation and Processing.  Phase 5 would be the process of validating 
and processing the metrics to measure the success of the program. 
 
Besides measuring the success of the program during this final phase of the framework, with 
all remediation activities completed, it would an opportune time to ensure Lesson are Learnt 
from the program activities.   
 
With this in mind Phase 5’s objectives are to:  
 Collect data and compare metric result as to measure the success of the program 
 Ensure that lessons learnt from the program and its sub projects are recorded and 
incorporated into future efforts to ensure continuous improvements. 
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3.5.1. Measure the success of the program 
Since the framework is designed to be iterative in nature, the first time it is completed certain 
metrics may only be measurable on the second iteration. If mature security metrics are pre-
existing then it may be possible to validate and process to substantiate success at this point.  
Since most organisations struggle with validating and processing metrics to identify value, 
SANS institute researcher Payne suggests that often threats cannot be measured since it’s the 
potential for harm combined with the fact that the practise of metric measuring is in the early 
stages of development making measuring success difficult (Payne, 2006). 
 
Metrics traditionally would be gathered from vulnerability management systems such as 
Qualys and Nessus and since metrics originating from those system would generally be 
“moving targets” (based on the facts that these systems collect patching vulnerabilities) and 
as such of little value to measure success of this program.   
 
Metrics would need to have been established during Phase 1 and if no data was collected, one 
would have to consider reverting back to basic metric analysis such as - the number of 
vulnerabilities remediated through route cause remediation versus a point is time remediation.  
This would require being creative with the metrics available and then substantiating 
remediation success. While very basic in nature it still provides an opportunity to measure the 
success of the program. 
 
A critical aspect of reporting on the metrics is ensuring what happens directly thereafter, as 
successes and failures should be learnt from and utilised to improve the security posture. In 
Section 3.5.2 the activities around this sub phase are discussed. 
 
3.5.2. Lessons Learnt 
Reviewing the program, the activities and findings provides an opportunity to gather 
information that could benefit other programs/projects in the future. Lessons learnt may not 
always be positive in nature but may consist of undesirable results which one would want to 
avoid in the future (United States Government, 2015).   
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The CIO’s office of the US Government describes lessons learnt as simply asking “What 
worked well or what didn’t work so well?” (United States Government, 2015). NIPP 
describes lessons learnt as a positive influence to aid in adaption of risk management 
activities and objective of a program to incorporate lessons learnt (Homeland Security, 2013).  
Furthermore by applying lesson learnt through the application of corrective actions it may 
ultimately reduce vulnerabilities that exist within the environment (Homeland Security, 
2013). 
 
Establishing a Lessons Learnt exercise should ensure that something is always learnt from the 
experience. Where there is an opportunity for innovation, the approach should be documented 
and shared to ensure application and where possible processes improvement (United States 
Government, 2015). 
 
During Section 3.5.1, the identification and review of metrics may include useful information 
for where the program/projects succeeded or failed. This will aid in ensuring that insight is 
achieved. The process of formalising lessons learnt could be achieved through a question 
style information sheet submitted to teams to discuss and report back on.  Valuable insight 
could be documented and circulated among key persons (United States Government, 2015). 
 
Metrics identified where favourable and non-favourable results were achieved could be used 
as topic points of questionnaires or workshops where the results are discussed among the 
project teams with outcomes documented and circulated. 
 
The Project Management Institute endorses an approach by engineer Terrell (Michael, 2014) 
for an effective lessons learnt: 
 Recognition for the need to have such a program 
 Selecting a champion to oversee the program 
 Ensuring the team member share in accountability 
 Encourage and reward the support of the program 
 Ensure effective communication of the results to the team. 
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3.5.3. Phase 5 Summary 
Activities performed during Phase 5 ultimately aim to measure the success of the initiatives, 
specifically activities performed during Phases 2-4.  The metrics identified during Phase 1 
would ultimately be utilised to measure the success and would contribute to the lessons 
learnt. 
 
How the lessons learnt are documented and circulated is almost secondary, what is key 
though is that the improvements identified are implemented. Depending on the extent, it may 
be necessary to formalise the remediations under suitable projects, depending on the extent of 
feedback received. Since the framework provides for continuous application and maturing of 
the organisation, the lessons learnt should be incorporated into the next iteration when 
applying the framework. 
 
3.6. Summary 
The proposed Framework is described as Hybrid in nature and should be seen as a guideline 
which organisations can follow and make the necessary changes or apply the appropriate 
exclusions based on their specific environments. 
 
The activities across the various sections within the proposed framework aim to achieve the 
following defined objectives (defined at the beginning of Section 3): 
 Ensure the approach is interactive in nature 
 Scalable to suit organisations with varying levels of maturity 
 Provides a top down approach, linked to key business processes 
 Has applicability across various environments. 
 
During Chapter 4, key activities of the proposed hybrid framework are applied as a 
simulation based on a fictitious organisation as to illustrate the applicability or rather 
suitability of the framework to achieve the above defined objectives. By applying key 
activities it provides further context to the value of the framework and potential 
improvements offered through the “hybrid approach”. 
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4  Chapter 4 
Framework case study simulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the case study is to simulate the application of the framework against a typical 
organisation.  The application of the case study covers key aspects of the hybrid framework, 
as shown in Figure 3, across the five phases. 
 
Since many of the activities within the hybrid framework are extensive in nature, it is quite 
challenging to simulate all activities. Furthermore there may be better value in focusing on 
key activities that are simpler to illustrate but difficult for immature environments to execute 
on, making it suitable for the challenging foundational activities to form the basis of the 
simulation. 
  
The key activities within the scope of case study are listed below per phase: 
 Phase 1 – Set Goals & Objectives 
 Identify the key business strategic objectives  
 Map IT objectives to that of business 
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 Phase 2 – Identify Critical Infrastructure 
 Perform Cyber Threat Assessment with Business and IT 
 Perform the Business Impact Assessments 
 Identify CI infrastructure and key interdependencies 
 Agree scope & approach with the business 
 Phase 3 – Assess & Analyse risk 
 Analyses and Prioritise 
 Conduct Impact Analysis 
 Assess Infrastructure Interdependencies  
 
Please note that Phases 4 and 5 are specifically excluded from the scope of the simulation due 
to requirement to have detailed information in-order to provide valuable output for those 
phases. 
4.1. Scenario 
Open Telecom, a telecommunications provider servicing the SOHO and SME market has 
recently become the target of a Cyber attack that resulted in the failure of key services being 
delivered to customers.  The impact of the Cyber attack resulted in a 5% drop in its share 
price as well as the invocation of penalties for inability to deliver key services which resulted 
in financial losses for the quarter. The telecommunications providers has over 3000 SME 
clients and manages the network infrastructure for South Africa’s Top 100 companies. 
 
Post forensic investigations were inconclusive due to the lack of available logging and 
monitoring information as well as the inability to confirm the validity of information that was 
collected.  It is believed that the attack may not actually have been intended for Open 
Telecom but rather one of its customers. Open Telecom Board of Directors has mandated the 
CIO to perform a full evaluation on the environment and report back to the board on 
vulnerabilities identified and the plan for remediation. Figure 20 depicts the departmental 
structure of the organisation that will be used during the scope of the simulation. 
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Figure 20 - Open Telecom Structure 
 
4.2. Phase 1 – Set Goals and Objectives 
Open Telecom’s key strategic objectives as per its financial statement is: 
 To provide market leading services to its clients 
 Provide a positive return on investment in IT 
 Improve customer service 
 Achieve internal compliance and prompt mitigation of key risks 
 Sustain growth with strategic investment  
 Increase customers penetration of Internet Services 
 Ensure improved redundancy of service offerings through service continuity and 
availability 
 Create agility in the ability to respond to changing business requirements 
 Recruit and retain skilled and motivated persons. 
 
As per the hybrid approach, the businesses strategic objective will be applied to the balanced 
scorecard with the appropriate aligned IT objectives defined (refer to Figure 21). By 
combining the context of drivers as well as the business strategic objectives, the goals and 
objectives for the program can be defined. 
Open 
Telecom 
Billing Sales Finance 
Data 
Centre 
IT 
Data 
Centre 
Networks VOIP UNIX Windows 
Customer 
Support 
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Figure 21 – Example of a Business/IT Mapped Balanced Scorecard 
 
By reviewing defined IT objectives as well as the buisnesses strategic objectives in the 
context of the Cyber attacks and recent downtime experienced, the goals and objectives are 
suggested to be: 
 Understand the threat landscape facing Open Telecom  
 Identify material vulnerabilities and remediate 
 Identify infrastructure that is not maintained according to policies and procedures 
 Ensure the infrastructure is implemeted to achieve high availability through fault 
tollerance. 
 
4.3. Phase 2 – Identify Critical Infrastructure 
During phase 2 and within the scope of the scenario, the hybrid frameworks chosen activities 
are to: 
 Perform Cyber Threat Assessment with Business and IT 
 Identify CII infrastructure and key interdependencies. 
Sections 4.3.1 - 4.3.5 detail the output of the above two activities. 
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4.3.1. Phase 2 – Perform Cyber Threat Assessment with 
Business and IT 
Potential Cyber threat sources facing Open Telecom were presented to key representative of 
Business and IT for the purpose of discussing the relevance of the presented Cyber threat 
sources as well as discussion for inclusion of additional Cyber threat sources.  The output 
from the workshop included a threat assessment based on the motivation and capability of 
potential threat sources. An overall Threat Risk rating, as per Figure 22, was applied to each 
potential threat source as well as a motivation. 
 
The Motivation and Capability descriptions as per Table 5 (Section 3.2.1) were utilised for 
the workshops. The weightings identified, as illustrated in Figure 22, are illustrative in nature 
only. The Threat Risk Rating was achieved through the use of the table as per Figure 8 
(Section 3.2.1.). 
 
 
Threat Source Motivation Capability Threat Risk Rating 
Disgruntled employees 1 2 Negligible 
Extremist Organisations 3 3 Moderate 
Hacktivists 
 
4 4 Severe 
Nation States 
 
1 1 Negligible 
Corporations 2 2 Negligible 
Organised Crime Groups 3 5 Severe 
Customers of Open 
Telecom 
3 4 Substantial 
Figure 22 - Threat Risk Rating 
Based on the results from the above threat assessment, customers of Open Telecom and 
Hacktivists were identified as posing the greatest risk to Open Telecom.  Since Open 
Telecom provides Internet Connectivity and Managed Network services to its customer, one 
could understand how those two entities provide the greatest risk. Since Open Telecoms 
customers may be targeted the shared networks (key dependencies) would essentially affect 
Open Telecoms other customers should the attack be severe. 
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4.3.2. Phase 2 - Business Impact Assessment  
The Business Impact Assessment would generally be performed in a workshop style format 
with a developed BIA template being projected and representatives from the department 
working together to complete it. As context to this phase, extracts from Business Impact 
Assessments are detailed per area (Section 3.2.2). 
4.3.3. Phase 2 – Functional Breakdown 
The functional breakdown would be performed for each department within Open Telecom 
and within in each department the key business processes would be identified and expanded 
as per Figure 23.  Of key consideration is the Headcount per process that would be the 
number of persons involved in the process and the 
process type which relates to whether the process 
is automated or not (which will be important when identifying underlying dependency on 
systems with the consideration for manual process options). 
4.3.4. Phase 2 – Business Impact Assessment 
Figure 24 depicts the outcome of the Business Impact Assessment for the process as 
described in Section 3.3.2. Please note that the process impact would be considered across 
various impact categories. During Section 4.3.5 the underlying system dependencies are 
identified during which the critical impact, as defined by the Recovery Time Objective 
(“RTO”), will aid in establishing the criticality of Infrastructure. 
Process name Type of impact 0-4 hours 4-8 Hours Failure up 
to 2 Days 
< 1 week < 1 month > 1 
month 
Hardware 
Management and 
Support 
Financial Low Low Low High High High 
Legal/ Regulatory No impact No impact No impact High High High 
Health and Safety No impact No impact No impact No impact No impact No impact 
Reputational Low Low Medium High  High High 
Infrastructure Medium High High High High High 
Greatest impact Medium High High High High High 
RTO Required 4-8 Hours 
Figure 24 - RTO Table 
Process Name 
Headcount 
per 
process 
Process Description Critical periods 
Comments (regarding Days 
& Time) 
Process 
Type 
Hardware 
Support and 
Management 
7 
Business as usual activities 
relating to the maintenance, 
configuration, and repairing of 
hardware, operating systems and 
SAN storage nationally (Cape 
Town, JHB & Durban) 
Every day is 
critical 
This is key process and those 
servers not only support 
customers but also enable the 
operation of Open Telecoms.  
Partially 
Automated 
Figure 23 - Functional Breakdown Example 
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4.3.5. Phase 2 – Identify CI related infrastructure and 
dependencies 
The key system dependencies, as presented in Figure 25, represent the mapping of critical 
business processes to that of supporting systems that essentially can be deemed at critical. By 
mapping the key supporting system to the underlying infrastructure it now becomes possible 
to map Critical Infrastructure. Topology diagrams as suggested in Section 3.2.3 would 
probably be the easiest way to identify the supporting infrastructure by tracing from a Level 5 
stack down. 
 
Figure 25 - Critical Dependency Mapping 
Figure 26 represents graphically the mapping of critical process to the application stack and 
the infrastructure and from this, phase 3 scope will be defined. 
 
Figure 26 - Process to Infrastructure Mapping 
System Dependant Process Process 
RTO 
Internal Dependency External Dependency Required  
RTO 
Required 
RPO 
System 1 Hardware Management and 
Support 
4-8 Hours Customers, Internal Systems Eskom, Telkom, Neotel 4-8 Hours 0-2 Hours 
System 2 Hardware Management and 
Support 
4-8 Hours Customers, Internal Systems Eskom, Telkom, Neotel 4-8 Hours 0-2 Hours 
System 3 Hardware Management and 
Support  
4-8 Hours Customers, Internal Systems Eskom, Telkom, Neotel 4-8 Hours 0-2 Hours 
System 4 Hardware Management and 
Support 
4-8 Hours Customers, Internal Systems Eskom, Telkom, Neotel 4-8 Hours 0-2 Hours 
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4.3.5.1. Phase 2 - Agree scope & approach with the business 
During Phase 2, the identification of critical processes, mapped to critical systems, mapped to 
critical infrastructure, would have aided in defining the scope that would now be discussed 
and agreed with the business. The benefit in this approach in the hybrid framework is that it 
provides a top down approach driven largely by business drivers, as opposed to bottom up 
that would traditionally be driven by business.   Once the scope is agreed it provides the 
platform for Phase 3, the most critical phase, of the hybrid framework, which is essentially 
the gap analysis. 
4.3.6. Phase 3 – Analyse and Prioritise 
The key activities for Phase 3 are to: 
 Identify key dependencies in Open Telecom’s infrastructure based on its 
services/identification of infrastructure dependencies 
 Conduct the Impact Analysis & Conduct Risk Characterisation.  
 
4.3.6.1.  Phase 3 - Assess Infrastructure Interdependencies 
 
The application of the PreDict approach on Open Telecom maps the dependencies on 
processes to key applications as depicted Figure 27. Where this differs from the activities that 
produced Figure 26 (4.3.5) is that you are adding a dependency critical rating to each 
dependency. The output of this activity provides context to the criticality of the dependency 
which will be utilise during Section 4.3.6.2. 
 
 Application 1 Application 2 Eskom Telkom Neotel 
Hardware 
Management & 
Support 
Critical Significant Moderate Minimal None 
Process 2      
Process 3      
Process 4      
Process 5      
Process 6      
Figure 27 - PreDict application on Open Telecom 
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4.3.6.2. Phase 3 - Conduct Impact Analysis & Conduct Risk 
Characterisation 
For this activity ENISA’s National Risk Assessment is utilised, which was discussed during 
Section 3.3.4.2. To illustrate the application of inputs for simulation, the risk assessment will 
be performed a single instance. 
 
 
Figure 28 - Application of ENISA Risk Assessment 
4.4.  Summary 
As discussed during Section 4.1, Phases 4 and 5 are specifically excluded from the scope of 
this simulation due to requirement to have detailed information from Phase 3 which would 
form the foundation to complete the deliverables for Phases 4 and 5. 
 
Phase 4 and 5 would specifically deal with the development of a roadmap for remediation of 
identified vulnerabilities and ultimately enable the process of remediation, which in the above 
simulation would be challenging to illustrate. 
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5  Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical Infrastructure is at risk and in order to protect it one needs to understand what is 
deemed as critical before it can be protected.  Once it is known was is critical, it is important 
to understand what one is protecting it from.  During the research traditional Infrastructure 
such as Electricity, Water and Airports was considered as Critical with a new entrant being 
the critical importance of the Internet.  
 
The Internet as a new entrant into the category of Critical Infrastructure, is largely since 
Society has become very reliant on the Internet as tool for communications and of course 
Commerce’s reliance on the internet to transact.  The reliance on the Internet as a global 
communications network was identified as one of the greatest risks to Critical Infrastructure.  
The Internet provides the perfect medium for interconnecting Critical Infrastructure, 
managing Critical Infrastructure remotely and also the perfect platform to attack Critical 
Infrastructure. 
 
The risk of attack on Critical Infrastructure is largely relevant now since the evolution of 
Critical Infrastructure communication from serial and dedicated communications lines to that 
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of an IP based network.  Through the use of poorly implemented security controls, these IP 
based network have been exposed to the Internet. 
 
To try and substantiate the risk that Critical Infrastructure faces, the threats and challenges 
were discussed through key case studies/real world examples including examples of Cyber 
Crime and Cyber warfare (refer to Section 2.6).  Furthermore the definitions and motivations 
were discussed in the context of CI.   
 
The awareness to protect CI of countries globally was identified through specific examples 
where developed economies have initiated steps through legislation and focus groups to drive 
the awareness and protection of Critical Infrastructure.  Key examples of strong security 
controls were identified applicable to various sectors and industries (refer Section 2.9.3) 
including controls that are often found to be deficient in CI environments. 
 
Understand the security control that should be implemented in CI is important, but 
identifying the deficient controls or rather the vulnerabilities within the environment is a 
critical challenge. Critical Infrastructure environments can generally span large geographic 
areas and one should also consider that some environments have key interdependencies on 
other environments and other environments on it.  Therefore identifying vulnerabilities and 
testing for vulnerabilities may be very complicated and for first time assessments a daunting 
task. 
5.1. Research Objectives 
The core objectives of the research were achieved as follow: 
 
Provide context for what is considered to Critical Infrastructure and why it is now at 
risk - During Section 2.1 context was provided as to what would be considered to be Critical 
ranging from water, roads, airports and the Internet. During Section 2.6 justification was 
provided as to why Critical Infrastructure is now as risk including examples of where the 
evolution of Critical Infrastructure has introduced risk. 
 
Identify the overlap between Critical Infrastructure and Critical Information 
Infrastructure - The advent of the Internet as Critical Information Infrastructure through its 
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prolific use of it as a global network was discussed during Section 2.2 as well as in Section 
2.7. 
 
Identify key attacks on Critical Infrastructure in the context of Cyber Warfare and 
Cybercrime - Examples of Cyber Crime were discussed during sections 2.7.1 - 2.7.3 as well 
Cyber Warfare during sections 2.8.1-2.8.3, during which both instances included discussions 
surrounding the nature of the attacks and the consequences. 
 
To identify methodologies applicable to the protection of Critical Infrastructure in the 
context of immature environments – The NIPP approach as well as the OECD approach to 
Critical Infrastructure protection was discussed during Section 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 respectively. 
 
Propose activities that will enable the protection of Critical Infrastructure in the context 
of the proposed methodology, including the identification of appropriate activities per 
phase of the methodology - During Section 3 of research, a hybrid framework was 
developed based on various other frameworks relating to Critical Infrastructure protection. 
The framework was largely based on the NIPP framework for protecting Critical 
Infrastructure, however the detailed activities that one should conduct were quite high level 
and as such the framework identified key activities for key phases along with examples 
providing real life context to the application of the framework.  
 
For certain sections extensive detail was provided and in many cases more than one approach 
to a phase was discussed. The framework (like all framework) should be seen as a continual 
evolving approach and users of the framework should substitute key activities for other 
activities should they feel improved suitability for their application. 
 
 
Identify at a high level appropriate controls for protecting Critical Infrastructure - 
During Section 2.9.3 various key controls were discussed that would aid in the protection of 
Critical Infrastructure.  The benefit of Cyber Incident Forensic Readiness was discussed in 
detail in Section 2.10.  
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5.2. Future Work 
The framework should not be seen as final product but rather a work in progress. Areas that 
could be explored and developed further are as follows: 
1. Critical Infrastructure dependency modelling could be improved and justified through 
real-life case studies 
2. Collation of breach data among Critical Infrastructure would be insightful including root 
cause analysis 
3. Development of specific Critical Infrastructure security metrics would be advantageous. 
 
In closing, the research and the proposed framework provides a strong starting point for 
organisations that want to understand the importance of identifying and protecting Critical 
Infrastructure to do so.  The framework is tangible and activities are well articulated for 
immature environments, potential controls aiding in the protection of Critical Infrastructure 
are discussed with the appropriate context. 
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